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Abstract 
Whilst in some financial systems in the early twentieth century 
commercial and investment banking activities were carried out by functionally 
separate firms, in others both kinds of operation were conducted under one roof 
by “universal banks”. Explaining the evolutionary paths that lead to these 
divergent banking structures has remained a hot topic of multidisciplinary 
debate for many years. So has their respective exposure to financial crises. On 
the one hand, universal banks – which hold both long- and short-term assets – 
are able to reduce information asymmetries and internalise risk. But on the 
other hand, their mixed asset structure arguably decreases versatility during an 
economic downturn and may create a “dual market for lemons” in which 
information asymmetries cause financially sound clients and banks to exit the 
market, leaving only the riskier crisis-prone ones behind.  
This paper analyses these debates using the case study of the 
Netherlands in the early 1920s. The literature argues that it is during this 
decade that the Netherlands experienced her one and only traditional banking 
crisis from 1600 to the present day, and after which her short-lived experiment 
with a system of universal banking came to an end. By calculating an equity-
deposit ratio panel for the Big Five Dutch banks, this paper attempts to measure 
to what degree the sector evolved to become universal and subsequently 
returned to functional separation. It then conducts a matched pair comparison of 
two similar-sized banks operating in the Netherlands in the 1920s: the 
Amsterdamsche Bank and the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging. Whilst the first 
escaped the crisis relatively unscathed, the second required assistance from 
the Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch central bank. A new and detailed narrative 
of one episode of the crisis using as yet unused primary sources is developed 
for this comparison. 
This paper finds that the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging was more 
universal than her Amsterdam rival. It concludes that it was primarily this 
difference that caused her to suffer during the crisis. However, it does so with 
caution in view of the paucity of data to hand and methodological restrictions.  
                                                 
1 Email: c.l.colvin@lse.ac.uk. The author would like to thank Tim Leunig for 
supervision, Joost Jonker and Gerben Bakker for helpful comments and suggestions 
on an earlier draft of this paper, and Dick Wijmer and Ries Roowaan at the ABN AMRO 
Historish Archief in Weesp, as well as staff at the Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch 
Archief in Amsterdam, for help identifying and locating primary source materials. Usual 
disclaimers apply. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is common to distinguish between financial systems in which 
commercial and investment banking are carried out by separate firms, 
and those in which “universal banks” carry out both kinds of operation. 
This paper addresses two issues: (1) under what conditions universal 
banks come into existence; and (2) whether there is a relationship 
between financial system structure and financial crises. The Dutch 
financial system in the 1920s is an interesting case study with which to 
examine these questions. Until the early twentieth century, the Dutch 
system was characterised by functionally separated banking.2 But various 
developments just prior to and during the First World War transformed 
this system. Banks became directly involved in the finance of industry, as 
opposed to through intermediaries.3 By the early 1920s, the Dutch 
financial system had in many ways more in common with her German 
rather than her Anglo-Saxon counterpart. But following a series of (near) 
bank failures in the early to mid 1920s, Dutch banks underwent a reversal 
in bank policy and returned to their functionally separated roots.4  
This paper examines its central questions using a matched pair 
case study of two similar-sized Dutch banks, one that fared badly in the 
crisis and one that did not. The secondary literature suggests that these 
two banks had different policies with regards to long and short-term 
business. It argues that the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, the bank 
that fared badly, adopted a universal structure more enthusiastically than 
                                                 
2 J. Jonker, "Competing in Tandem: Securities Markets and Commercial Banking 
Patterns in Europe During the Nineteenth Century.," in The Origins of National 
Financial Systems: Alexander Gerschenkron Reconsidered, ed. D. J. Forsyth, et al.,  
(2002), 84.  
3 e.g. Joh. de Vries, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank: Visserings Tijdvak 
1914-1931, Vol. V Part 1 (1989), 208. 
4 J. Jonker, "Sinecures or Sinews of Power? Interlocking Directorship and Bank-
Industry Relations in the Netherlands, 1910-1940," Economic and Social History in the 
Netherlands 3 (1991), 165.  
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her rival in Amsterdam, the Amsterdamsche Bank. This paper must 
determine: (1) whether the difference presented in the literature between 
the two banks is accurate, and if so, (2) whether it was this difference in 
bank structure that explains the crisis. 
This paper is divided into four further sections. Section 2 presents a 
thematic overview of various developments in the Dutch banking sector 
up to and including the 1920s crisis period using the secondary literature 
on Dutch financial history. Sections 3 and 4 then address this paper’s two 
main questions. Section 3 does this using both the theoretical finance 
theory and the applied finance history literatures. Section 4, the matched 
pair comparison, addresses these questions using a statistical 
methodology and through the analysis of primary source materials, 
including contemporary newspaper articles and high-level management 
papers from the archives of the two banks. Section 5 concludes that 
adopting a universal structure appears to increase a bank’s exposure to 
crises, but with some provisos regarding reverse causality. However, a 
conclusion on the paper’s other main question, the determinants of 
financial systems evolution, could not be made due to various archival 
difficulties.  
Before proceeding, the main (macroeconomic) developments in the 
Dutch economy from the fin de siècle to the late 1920s are briefly 
examined for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with Dutch economic 
history. The question asked here is how the Dutch economy fits into the 
wider European picture. The traditional view is that the Netherlands was a 
loyal follower of the British example.5 This view looks initially attractive. 
Like Britain she experienced a short postwar boom followed by economic 
downturn in the early 1920s. Like Britain she returned her currency to the 
                                                 
5 J. L. van Zanden and R. T. Griffiths, Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland in de 
20e Eeuw (1989), 110. 
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gold standard in 1925. And like Britain she experienced economic growth 
and relative prosperity in the second half of the 1920s. But in light of 
research conducted over the last two decades, this view has been 
revised. Three themes in this literature are (briefly) examined: (1) the 
Netherlands’ apparent late industrialisation; (2) the economic impact of 
her neutral status during the First World War; and (3) the reversal in the 
business cycle in the early 1920s. 
(1) Industrialisation. Economic historians have long debated the 
issue of the start of industrialisation in the Netherlands. In the older 
literature, opinions range from I. J. Brugmans, who dates its beginning in 
the 1850s,6 to J. A. de Jonge, who argues for the mid-1890s.7 But in 
1980, Richard T. Griffiths questioned the statistics on which historians 
had traditionally drawn their conclusions, which he argued were 
fragmentary and only told the picture for a small part of the economy.8 
This inspired Jan Luiten van Zanden to lead a research project into Dutch 
industrialisation using modern growth accounting techniques.9 The 
project, which took over a decade to complete, has recently concluded 
that Dutch industrialisation probably commenced in the 1870s as a result 
of increased investment as a proportion of GDP (due to fall in relative 
prices of labour versus capital, and a decline interest rates), which in turn 
is made possible through increased savings.10  
                                                 
6 I. J. Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht: Sociaal-Economische Geschiedenis 
van Nederland 1795-1940 (1961), 201. 
7 J. A. de Jonge, De Industrialisatie in Nederland Tussen 1850 en 1914 (1968), 340-
343. 
8 R. T. Griffiths, "Backward, Late or Different? Aspects of the Economic Development 
of the Netherlands in the 19th Century," in The Economic Development of the 
Netherlands since 1870, ed. J. L. v. Zanden,  (1996). 
9 See preface to J. L. van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, The Strictures of Inheritance: 
The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century (2004). 
10 Ibid., 270. The raw results of the project were printed in a consolidated volume: R. J. 
van der Bie and J.-P. Smits, eds., Tweehonderd Jaar Statistiek in Tijdreeksen, 1800-
1999 (2001). 
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(2) War. The Netherlands found herself in a very precarious 
geographical position during the First World War: sandwiched between 
the belligerent nations. To maintain her neutrality, and to remain 
successful, she had to play a fine balancing act between the wishes of 
Germany on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other. 
Despite this unique situation, the Netherlands has only received scant 
attention in the vast literature on the First World War.11 And historians 
who have examined the period treated the war as the beginning or end 
point of their discourse, forgetting to place it in a wider trans-war 
context.12 Recently, a new literature has sought to analyse the economic 
impact of the war. It has found that it varies greatly depending on which 
aspect of the economy is examined, but that in general it had a net 
positive effect. New estimates of real Dutch GDP show growth by 2.10 
percent over the period 1913-1921, and by 0.64 percent in per capita 
terms.13 When compared to the US (which grew by 1.44 percent over the 
same period, and by only 0.05 percent in per capita terms), or to 
Northwest Europe as a whole  (which suffered a contraction of GDP by 
0.43 percent, and by 1.04 percent in per capita terms), the Dutch figures 
look even more impressive.14 Much of this can arguably be explained by 
neutrality, which prevented the destruction to the kingdom’s industry, 
agriculture and labour force, and largely enabled her to continue to 
prosper from trade with nations on both sides of the conflict. But Herman 
J. de Jong argues that the Netherlands emerged from the conflict in a 
                                                 
11 M. Frey, "Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands in the First World War," 
The International History Review XIX, No. 3 (1997). 541 
12 H. J. de Jong and R. M. Albers, "Industriële Groei in Nederland, 1913-1929: Een 
Verkenning," NEHA Jaarboek voor Economische, Bedrijfs- en Techniekgeschiedenis 
57 (1994). 445 
13 B. van Ark and H. J. de Jong, "Accounting for Economic Growth in the Netherlands 
since 1913," Economic and Social History in the Netherlands 7 (1996), 201. 
14 Ibid. Figure for Northwest Europe is an unweighted average of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK.  
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significantly stronger position, especially with respect to industrialisation 
and productivity growth,15 and that this improvement was over and above 
her long-term path, i.e. that the war acted as a trend break.16 It has also 
recently been argued that the population in general benefited from her 
neutral politics, not just a small industrial and commercial elite: the author 
shows that standards of living (measured by a composite index of income 
per head, longevity and education) improved over the trans-war period.17
(3) Depression. Immediately following the end of hostilities, Dutch 
industry experienced an upswing in demand. The economic outlook 
appeared so positive that the government was able to concede to trade 
union demands for shorter working hours and introduced a new 45-hour 
workweek in 1919.18 But this positivism did not last long: by September 
1923, the London correspondent of the Dutch daily newspaper De 
Telegraaf wrote: ‘On all hands it is admitted that the situation in the 
Netherlands is worse than the present generation has ever known.’19 In 
some respects the economy had indeed turned sour: over the period 
1920-1923, unemployment was up from 1.75 percent to 3.30 percent, the 
cost of living had fallen by 25 percent, and bankruptcies risen from below 
1500 a year to nearly 4000 a year.20 And it is against this backdrop that 
the Netherlands experienced her only classic banking crisis in the entire 
                                                 
15 H. J. de Jong, "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Dutch Economy 
During World War I," in The Economics of World War I, ed. S. N. Broadberry, et al.,  
(2005). 138 
16 De Jong and Albers, "Industriële Groei in Nederland, 1913-1929: Een Verkenning." 
445 
17 C. L. Colvin, "War Makes People Better Off: An Attempt to Measure the Impact of the 
First World War on the Quality of Life in the Netherlands,"  (Mimeo, Economic History 
Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006). 
18 For a full account of the debate, see L. Heerma van Voss, De Doodsklok voor den 
Goeden Ouden Tijd: De Achturendag in de Jaren Twintig (1994). 
19 J. C. van der Veer, "The Dutch Economic Situation," The Economist, 22 September 
1923. 
20 Van Zanden and Griffiths, Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20e 
Eeuw, 111. 
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period from 1600 to the present day.21 However, by international 
standards the plight of the Dutch economy was arguably unremarkable. 
For instance, annual real income per capita (measured by real Net 
National Product (GNP minus taxes), deflated using consumer prices) 
actually rose by 6.2 percent over this same period (1920-1923).22 And 
taking the decade as a whole, the Netherlands fared very well on 
international standards.23 Despite this, much of the history writing of the 
1920s remains negative and describes it as a deep depression. Perhaps 
views remain clouded by the negativity of the contemporary 1920s 
observers of the Dutch economy. Indeed, in 1989, Griffiths noted exactly 
this and argued therefore that: ‘the history writing of the period 1920-1923 
awaits a thorough revision by historians of the Netherlands’.24
 
 
2. Dutch Banking: A Thematic Overview 
The Dutch banking sector underwent some substantial changes in the 
first decades of the twentieth century. At the turn of the century, banks played 
second fiddle to a sophisticated capital market. By the time of the crisis in the 
early 1920s, they had developed into large multi-branch networks with a wide 
portfolio of client types. This section presents a thematic overview of arguably 
the most important developments in the sector. The changing relationship 
between banks and industry is central to this review. Special attention is given 
to the impact of the following: (1) the declining dominance of the prolongatie on-
call money market; (2) the bank merger wave that commenced just prior to the 
First World War; (3) the short trade-led postwar boom and the economic 
“depression” that followed; and (4) the changing role of the Dutch central bank. 
                                                 
21 J. L. van Zanden, "Old Rules, New Conditions, 1914-1940," in A Financial History of 
the Netherlands, ed. M. t. Hart, et al.,  (1997), 143. 
22 Colvin, "War Makes People Better Off," 6. 
23 C. H. Feinstein et al., The European Economy between the Wars (1997), 13. 
24 Author’s translation, Zanden and Griffiths, Economische Geschiedenis van 
Nederland in de 20e Eeuw, 115. 
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Table 1. Assets of Financial Institutions as a Percentage of Sector Total, 
1900-1928 
1900 1913 1918 1923 1928
Nederlandsche Bank 25.4 15.7 22.3 17.9 13
Commercial banks 36.2 44.9 52.4 48.5 54
      Big Five 17.4 22.7 26.6 23.3 22
Savings banks 8.2 6.4 3.4 4.7 5
Rijkspostspaarbank 7.8 8.8 5 5.4 6
Agricultural banks 0.1 2.3 4.2 5.6 7
Mortgage banks 22.3 21.9 10.9 10.7 13
Giro services - - 1.8 7.3 3
Total assets (in millions 
of guilders) 1,091 2,315 5,472 6,441 7384
Idem , as a percentage of 
national income 61 83 134 122 113
 
Notes: National income is measured as Net National Income at market prices. The Big 
Five constituted the Amsterdamsche Bank, the Incasso-Bank, the Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij, the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging and the Twentsche Bank. 
Since 1990 all are part of the ABN AMRO Bank.  
Source: Van Zanden, "Old Rules, New Conditions, 1914-1940." 127 
 
 
(1) Prolongatie. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the 
Netherlands had an advanced financial system with a sophisticated 
capital market and a funded and consolidated system of national debt. 
She had a centralised unitary state and a central bank that suffered little 
government interference. But despite this, her private banking sector was 
relatively small and restricted itself mainly to the finance of international 
trade. The sector had not yet entered the business of universal banking.25 
                                                 
25 J. Jonker, "Competing in Tandem: Securities Markets and Commercial Banking 
Patterns in Europe During the Nineteenth Century.," in The Origins of National 
Financial Systems: Alexander Gerschenkron Reconsidered, ed. D. J. Forsyth, et al.,  
(2002), 68. 
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In fact, comparatively little banking activity went on at all: in 1913, 64 
percent of Dutch money supply was in the form of banknotes, versus 29 
percent in Belgium, 37 percent in Germany and only four percent in 
Britain.26 Jonker argues that the Netherlands ended up without universal 
banks because her sophisticated financial system inherited from earlier 
times simply left no room for them.27 Amsterdam merchants had 
developed a flexible credit source called prolongatie – short-term credit 
borrowed against securities. This system outcompeted the commercial 
banking system in the provision of commercial finance.  
The outbreak of war in July 1914 changed the situation 
dramatically, and arguably sparked a revolution in Dutch banking. The 
Amsterdam stock exchange was temporarily closed in fear of a crash, 
and the prolongatie system – which relied on a functioning exchange – 
was frozen as a result. The system never recovered, despite the 
exchange re-opening. During the war, the commercial banking sector 
largely filled the void left by the defunct prolongatie market and “sucked 
in” some of the increased liquidity as a result of new war business: as a 
proportion of total money supply, bank deposits increased from 23 
percent in 1906 to almost 56 percent by 1920.28 As a result, banks 
became increasingly involved with the direct finance of industry, helping 
to establish big conglomerates (e.g. steel producer Hoogovens in 1918), 
and arguably started to operate more like German universal banks. 
Jonker argues that the reason for the prolongatie market’s downfall lies 
with a change in the Dutch interest rate structure.29 From the late 1890s 
banks could not compete for deposits because short-term interest rates 
                                                 
26 Van Zanden, "Old Rules, New Conditions, 1914-1940," 125. 
27 Jonker, "Competing in Tandem," 69. 
28 Van Zanden, "Old Rules, New Conditions, 1914-1940," 125. 
29 J. Jonker, "Spoilt for Choice? Banking Concentration and the Structure of the Dutch 
Banking Market, 1900-1940," in The Evolution of Financial Institutions and Markets in 
Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Y. Cassis, et al.,  (1995), 191-192. 
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were significantly above the yield on government bonds. But because of 
the increased risks associated with the outbreak of war, the yield on 
government bonds rose to a level higher than the short-term interest rate 
on prolongaties, which therefore became an expensive form of credit for 
longer than a month.  
 
Table 2. Developments in the Dutch Commercial Banking Sector, 1900-
1930 
merged
taken 
over
liquida-
ted
bank-
rupted
1900 242
1901-1905 279 +37 52 15 0 2 6 7
1906-1910 305 +26 47 21 1 1 12
1911-1915 356 +51 79 28 1 9 7
1916-1920 330 -26 76 102 5 83 12
1921-1925 375 45 93 48 1 23 13 1
1926-1930 385 +10 67 57 2 20 28
of which:
Total 
7
11
2
1
6
bank 
number
Net 
change
Newly 
estab-
lished
Dissa-
peared
 
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank. Financiële Instellingen in Nederland 1900-1985: 
Balansreeksen en Naamlijst van Handelsbanken, 1987, 17. 
 
 
(2) Bank concentration. In addition to significant growth in the size 
and scope of the Dutch system, the first decades of the twentieth century 
also experienced a merger wave. Whilst the number of independent 
banks increased from 242 in 1900 to 375 by 1921-1925 (see Table 2), as 
a proportion of total bank assets, that of the Big Five Dutch banks30 
increased from 17.4 percent in 1900 to 23.3 percent in 1923 (see Table 
1). The merger wave between banks started in earnest in 1911, the year 
                                                 
30 See Note under Table 1 for list of Big Five 
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in which the Rotterdamsche Bank merged with the Deposito- en 
 Administratiebank to form the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging 
(RBV). The concentration process continued as banks in the big cities of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague bought up provincial bank 
networks.31 The banks evolved from trade financiers to algemene banken 
(general banks), offering a complete range of services to their clients.32
Despite the increased concentration, the sector remained 
segmented. Although the Big Five were increasing in size relative to the 
rest of the sector, they by no means dominated. There were a host of 
smaller, and often specialised, banks operating in the kingdom throughout 
the transwar period. These included smaller algemene banks such as the 
Rotterdam-based Marx & Co.’s Bank and the Amsterdam banks Bank 
Associatie and Algemeene Spaar- en depositobank. There were a large 
number of provincial banks, some of which were independent, and others 
of which were part owned – or even fully owned – subsidiaries of the 
larger algemene banks. There was a group of overseas banks that 
specialised in the finance of trade with the Dutch East Indies and other 
colonies. A number of banks were specialised in the investment banking 
business of securities. Others specialised in deposit banking. These were 
known as the middenstandsbanken, or banks for the middle classes. 
There were also a number state or municipality-owned savings houses. 
And small credit cooperatives along the lines of the German Raiffeisen 
model were an increasingly popular means of securing credit in rural 
communities.  
(3) Boom and bust. Following the end of the Allied blockade and 
the German U-boat campaign in 1918, Dutch industry and agriculture 
enjoyed a period of export-led growth. Increased profit potential resulted 
                                                 
31 De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 205. 
32 Jonker, "Spoilt for Choice?," 288. 
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in a strong demand for bank credit.33 The massive expansion in gold 
reserves of the Nederlandsche Bank during the war (from 170.7 million to 
726.4 million guilders) underpinned this expansion.34 But by 1920, the 
Dutch economic cycle reversed. The Dutch commercial banking system 
came under massive deflationary pressure, which can be partly attributed 
to the state’s plan to return the link between the guilder and gold at pre-
war parity, and partly to her German assets had been rendered worthless 
as a result of the hyperinflation in that country. In 1921, rumours started 
about the RBV being overstretched, and caused a run on the otherwise 
financially sound Algemeene Spaar- en depositobank.35 In 1922, Marx & 
Co.’s Bank was forced into liquidation.36 Then, after a period of relative 
calm, the RBV and several smaller banks and credit cooperatives ran 
aground in 1924-25. In all, more than 35 banks were hit by the crisis in 
the Netherlands, though some survived.37  
By 1924, the Dutch enthusiasm with universalism had started to 
wane. Marx & Co.’s Bank, which had invested heavily in industrial 
enterprises, was wound down at great cost to the Nederlandsche Bank 
(some 10 million guilders).38 And the RBV had to call in the 
Nederlandsche Bank to act as a guarantor and undergo a change in her 
management before she could continue. Although there have been a 
number of new historical works covering different aspects of Dutch 
financial history, as yet there has been no detailed analysis of the 
                                                 
33 De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 227. 
34 Ibid., 228-230. De Vries argues that much of this new credit was granted without 
sufficient inquiry into the long-term viability of the borrowers, especially that issued by 
provincial banks. 
35 Ibid., 233. 
36 Ibid., 242-243. 
37  J. Jonker and J. L. van Zanden, "Method in the Madness? Banking Crises between 
the Wars, an International Comparison," in Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe 
between the Wars, ed. C. H. Feinstein,  (1995), 80. See also Table 43 of De Vries, 
Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 243-238 for a fuller overview of the banks involved. 
38 De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 243. 
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determinants of the bank failures.39 This paper, and especially its Section 
4.2, aims to go some way towards rectifying this lack of understanding for 
the case of the RBV in 1924. 
(4) The central bank. The Nederlandsche Bank was a privately run 
joint-stock company, designed to be the Dutch state’s bank and the 
national circulation bank. She was granted the monopoly over the issue of 
government debt and of legal tender in the kingdom. In return, the 
government received a share of her profits, and had non-executive 
representation on her governing board.40 However, the role of the 
Nederlandsche Bank within the Dutch financial system as a whole 
remained ambiguous until at least the 1950s, especially with respect to 
lender-of-last-resort provision.41 The Bank competed with the private 
sector for the provision of business credit through a network of provincial 
branches. She effectively had a dual status as de facto regulator of, and 
competitor with, the commercial banks. And despite her new role as 
national financial coordinator during the war, her status in both these 
fields was arguably in relative decline. Whilst the banking sector was 
experiencing rapid change, the Nederlandsche Bank arguably failed to 
adapt. She had no formal regulatory role and did not monitor private 
banks.42 Johan de Vries argues that the Nederlandsche Bank was central 
to the structural crisis in the banking sector, that she was ‘sucked into the 
abyss of lack of experience’, especially with respect to the new universal 
                                                 
39 This is illustrated by the large gaps in De Vries’s Table 43  
40 J. Kymmell, Geschiedenis van de Algemene Banken in Nederland 1860-1914, Vol. II 
Part B (1996), 353. 
41 J. Jonker, "Between Private Responsibility and Public Duty. The Origins of Bank 
Monitoring in the Netherlands, 1860-1930," Financial History Review 3, No. 2 (1996), 
140-144. 
42 Kymmell, Geschiedenis van de Algemene Banken, 352. Indeed, the Bank’s lack of 
formal regulatory oversight was a topic of much debate in the 1920s, with some 
blaming the financial crisis on the lack of formal supervision of the private banking 
sector. See e.g. Hans Max Hirschfeld, Nieuwe Stroomingen in het Nederlandsche 
Bankwezen (1925), 24-29. 
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banking structure adopted by part of the sector.43 The bank arguably 
shared the sector’s naïve optimism and may therefore have remained 
oblivious to its problems. 
 
 
3.  Universal Banking: The Debates and the Dutch Case 
There has been much debate on the origins of different national 
financial systems, including why universal banks developed in some 
countries, whilst in others banks remained functionally separated. Since 
the 1950s, Alexander Gerschenkron’s “economic backwardness” thesis 
has dominated this literature.44 Gerschenkron argues that universal banks 
evolved in late-industrialising nations in order to compensate for structural 
impediments – or missing “prerequisites” – to economic growth. Although 
criticisms and exceptions to Gerschenkron’s thesis have emerged, 
alternative all-encompassing explanations are few. Daniel Verdier’s 
recent contributions are perhaps the closest to such an explanation.45 He 
argues that economic backwardness is irrelevant, instead defining 
universality as a function of market segmentation and lender-of-last-resort 
provision. Section 3.1 examines the evolution of the Dutch financial 
system in light of these models and the secondary literature presented in 
Section 2.  
In addition to the debate on the evolution of national financial 
systems, there is also much interest in the implications of alternative 
financial system structures, including their associated financial crisis risk. 
                                                 
43 Author’s translation, De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 232. 
44 Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays,  (1962). 
45 Summarised in Daniel Verdier, "Explaining Cross-National Variations in Universal 
Banking in Nineteenth-Century Europe, North America, and Australasia," in The Origins 
of National Financial Systems: Alexander Gerschenkron Reconsidered, ed. D. J. 
Forsyth, et al.,  (2002). 
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The traditional argument against universal banking systems is that when 
operating under one roof, commercial and investment bankers abuse 
conflicts of interest, and are responsible for the mismanagement of bank 
assets and the sale of low-quality, highly speculative securities to 
unsuspecting investors.46 But in light of new theoretical and empirical 
studies, this traditional view that universal banks are necessarily “evil” 
and that functionally separated banks are necessarily “good” has been 
reassessed. Section 3.2 examines the relationship between universality 
and financial crises using concepts from the asymmetric information 
literature, and subsequently looks at the exposure to financial crises of 
the Dutch financial system in the early twentieth century, again with the 
help of the secondary literature presented in Section 2. 
 
3.1 Gerschenkron, Verdier and the Evolution of the Dutch Financial 
System 
Gerschenkron argues that universal banks evolved as explicit 
instruments of industrialisation, designed to solve a market coordination 
failure. He proclaims that the industrialisation of England occurred 
through internal finance and without any substantial long-term investment 
from banks, but that Continental Europe – and particularly Germany – 
could not finance industrialisation in this way because of a scarcity of 
capital, technology and entrepreneurship.47 It was this “backwardness” 
that caused banks to combine short-term with long-term business, and 
therefore determined the evolution of their banking systems towards 
universality. And it was the universal banks in turn that determined 
                                                 
46 It was this type of argument that was the motivation for the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, 
which guaranteed the separation of commercial and investment banking in the US until 
1999. Carlos D. Ramírez, "Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for 
Corporate Investment?: Evidence from Bank and Insurance Affiliations," Journal of 
Economic History 59, No. 2 (1999), 373.  
47 Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness," 14. 
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Germany’s development of heavy rather than light industry, and the 
cartelisation of German companies.48 The net result, he argues, was that 
the industrialisation of Germany took place along lines similar to 
England’s, although by different means.49  
However, Gerschenkron’s thesis on the role of banks in 
industrialisation is not without its critics. Some academics notice 
important flaws in his historical narrative, whilst others criticise 
Gerschenkron’s narrow analytical scope. Rondo Cameron notes, for 
instance, that the establishment of German industry pre-dates the 
creation of her big joint-stock banks by several years, if not decades.50 
Caroline Fohlin argues that the German banks developed many of their 
Gerschenkronian “substitutes for prerequisites” only to a very limited 
extent during that country’s initial industrialisation.51 Joost Jonker argues 
that the development of Europe’s banks must be understood in tandem 
with that of her financial markets.52 Timothy Guinnane argues that 
German universal banks were only part of the picture, and that the role of 
other types of banking institutions also need to be considered.53 And 
Larry Neal argues that outside finance was crucial in the early stages of 
the British industrial revolution, although through capital markets not 
banks.54 But arguably Gerschenkron’s biggest flaw is that his model is 
practically un-falsifiable: just about anything can be construed as being a 
substitute for a prerequisite. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 15 
49 Ibid., 16 
50 Rondo Cameron, Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History 
(1972), 12-13. 
51 C. Fohlin, "Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?," 
Explorations in Economic History 36 (1999), 305-306. 
52 Jonker, "Competing in Tandem," 84. 
53 Timothy W. Guinnane, "Delegated Monitors, Large and Small: Germany’s Banking 
System, 1800-1914," Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2002), 74. 
54 Larry Neal, "The Finance of Business During the Industrial Revolution," in The 
Economic History of Britain since 1700. Volume 1: 1700-1860, ed. R. Floud, et al., 2nd 
edition,  (1994). 
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Given the theoretical difficulties of Gerschenkron’s thesis, and its 
problematic evidence, then how else can the diverging evolutionary paths 
of Europe’s financial systems be explained? Daniel Verdier has recently 
developed an alternative grand narrative.55 Whilst Gerschenkron’s thesis 
focuses on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet (loans and the 
demand thereof), Verdier emphasises instead the liability side (deposits). 
Verdier’s methodology is used in Section 4.1 to measure the level of 
universality of the Dutch banking sector during the period of her financial 
crisis. Meanwhile, this section continues first by examining Verdier’s 
model in more detail. Using the secondary literature on Dutch banking, it 
subsequently explores which of the two models presented in this section 
fits best the evolutionary path of the Dutch financial system. 
Verdier’s narrative begins with the unleashing of private banking 
fortunes into joint-stock deposit banking in the mid nineteenth century. 
Left to market forces alone, these new banks expanded domestically to 
benefit from internal economies of scale and scope, clustered together 
around financial centres to benefit from external economies associated 
with proximity to competition and clients, and expanded abroad to gain 
access to new business and to spread risks. These large banks and their 
increasing branch networks threatened to eat up or drive independent 
local (unit) banks out of the market, potentially to the detriment of small 
and medium-sized firms – the local banks’ clientele. Verdier argues that 
the degree to which this story was born out in practice depended on: (1) 
the power of local government to interfere with capital flows through 
legislation; and (2) the level of competition they received from state-run 
non-profit financial institutions, such as savings banks. Hence joint-stock 
banks operated in different countries to various degrees of success, 
                                                 
55 The exposition of this model draws freely from Chapter 6 of Daniel Verdier, Moving 
Money: Banking and Finance in the Industrialized World (2002). 
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depending on the power and priorities of local versus central government 
and the level of deposit market segmentation this created. 
Verdier argues that joint-stock banks naturally moved from 
investment banking towards more profitable and less risky “modern” 
deposit banking with the improvement of payments systems technology. 
The degree to which this was able to occur in practice depended on the 
ability of these banks to capture the market for individuals’ deposits. Left 
unhindered, such as in Britain, joint-stock banks completely left the 
business of investment banking behind. But in countries with a strong 
degree of segmentation, such as Germany, these banks were left mid-
course.  They did not completely vacate the field of investment banking 
because they could not capture a sufficient level of individuals’ deposits. 
Hence these banks became universal banks, offering both types of 
business. 
Fragmentation of the deposit market is for Verdier a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the stabilisation for universal banking. The 
second condition is the existence of a liquidity guarantor, such as a 
central bank with lender-of-last-resort functionality. The nature of 
universal banks, which mix illiquid long-term and liquid short-term assets, 
means that they have difficulty matching assets and liabilities, especially 
during (cyclical) business downturns. Balance sheets are uninformative 
and will not reveal the actual solvency of the bank. It is therefore difficult 
for universal banks to gain depositors’ trust because of the absence of a 
credible commitment mechanism. Thanks to a lender-of-last-resort 
guarantee, banks can operate without the risk of default during a financial 
crisis and are therefore able to attract deposits. 
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Figure 1. Universal banking as an Inverted-U Function of State 
Centralisation 
 
Source:  Verdier, "Explaining Cross-National Variations”, Figure 1.3, p.35 
 
 
In summary, Verdier has it that universal banking is only observed 
in countries with both segmented capital markets and in the presence of 
“modern” central banks. Specialised banking is observed if one of these 
two conditions is not met.  Verdier argues that the two forces tend to work 
in opposite directions: whilst the segmentation condition is not met in 
centralised states, the liquidity guarantee condition is not met if the state 
is too decentralised. Financial systems characterised by universal 
banking tend therefore to be present in semi-centralised states. This is 
illustrated by an inverted-U function of the degree of state centralisation 
(see Figure 1).  
This section now briefly explores which of the two models 
presented above best fits the evolutionary path of the Dutch financial 
system using the secondary literature. The relationship between the 
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banking “revolution” and the simultaneously occurring accelerated 
industrialisation at the beginning of the twentieth century is key to this 
debate. W. M. Westerman, son of the RBV’s director at the time of her 
creation in 1911, wrote in a 1920 dissertation that his father’s merger 
represented a trend break in Dutch economic development; when 
comparing 1910 with 1911, he states that ‘the difference is so remarkable 
that one can scarcely imagine that such a genuine and sudden reversal 
could have been caused by anything else [than the merger]’.56 He argues 
that the developments in the sector, and in particular the increased 
coverage of the branch networks, were the cause of the industrialisation. 
In essence, this is a Gerschenkronian argument avant la lettre.  
Conversely, Jonker argues that the banking revolution occurred in 
response to industrialisation, and not because of it.57 He argues that the 
‘banks barely manage to keep pace with economic developments despite 
expansion and concentration’.58 Although he notes that some banks 
started to forge closer ties with industry following rising industrial profits, 
he argues not all banks did so. The sector as a whole was largely 
conservative in its outlook and many banks did not wholeheartedly 
embrace the German universal banking model.59 When banks did 
eventually start to develop and move into long-term credit provision, they 
were following industry rather than leading it. 
Perhaps the Netherlands’ sophisticated financial markets (with her 
prolongatie system) could be interpreted as a Gerschenkronian missing 
prerequisite, and an alternative to universal banks in the Netherlands’ 
early industrialisation. But if so, then it was arguably not a very successful 
                                                 
56 Author’s translation, W. M. Westerman, De Concentratie in het Bankwezen: Een 
Bijdrage Tot de Kennis der Economische Ontwikkeling van Onzen Tijd, 2e ed. (1920), 
120. 
57 Jonker, "Spoilt for Choice?," 203-204. 
58 Ibid., 188 
59 Ibid., 188, 202 
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one: despite the tentative industrialisation of the late nineteenth century, 
the Netherlands lacked a significant industrial sector. A further criticism is 
that Gerschenkron’s thesis makes no explicit provision for a decline in 
universality, as occurred in the Netherlands following her crisis. 
 
Table 3. Equity-Deposit Ratios for 16 Countries, 1913 
Profit, 
centre 
(a)
Non-
profit, 
private 
(b)
Non-
profit, 
state (c)
Profit, 
local 
(d)
Australia 65 34 1 0 0.35
Austria-Hungary 37 58 5 0 2.00
Belgium 59 1 40 0 0.72
Canada 92 3 5 0 0.19
Denmark 49 51 0 0 0.32
France 66 8 26 0 0.43
Germany 28 71 1 0 0.73
Italy 27 40 33 0 0.88
Netherlands 54 22 23 0 1.58
New Zealand 58 4 38 0 -
Norway 49 51 0 0 0.25
Spain 67 33 0 0 5.00
Sweden 63 35 2 0 0.45
Switzerland 39 61 0 0 0.56
UK 80 6 14 0 0.10
US 33 25 0 42 0.25
Share of the deposit market by 
sector, 1913 in percent
Equity-
deposit 
ratio, 
1913
 
 
Notes: (a) constitute commercial banks regulated by the central government; (b) 
constitute savings banks, credit societies, mortgage banks; (c) constitute postal 
savings banks; and (d) constitute commercial banks regulated by local government. 
Source: Verdier, "Explaining Cross-National Variations”, 36. For the Netherlands, 
Verdier uses only data for the Big Five. 
 
 
Verdier tests his hypothesis by developing a quantitative measure 
of universality: the equity-deposit ratio. This is the ratio of a bank’s least 
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liquid resources (capital plus reserves) to its most liquid ones (deposits 
plus savings). The idea is that commercial banks that specialise in short-
term lending have little need for short-term equity. Instead they finance 
their activities with short-term deposits and savings, without the risk of 
illiquidity in the event of a bank run. Universal banks, in contrast, have 
long-term positions in industry, and must therefore maintain long-term 
resources in case they turn illiquid during an economic downturn. 
Therefore, whilst lower values of the ratio suggest that specialist 
commercial banking is dominant, higher values suggest universal 
banking. Verdier argues that the ratio is bounded upwards, as too high a 
value would indicate a specialisation in investment banking.60 However, 
Verdier is unclear on exactly how high the ratio has to be before 
investment banking is considered dominant. 
Verdier calculates the equity-deposit ratio for a cross-section of the 
aggregate balances of the major banks of 16 countries in 1913. This is 
reported in Table 3 above, in addition to the share of the deposit market 
held by bank type. Verdier argues that in general the evidence supports 
his hypothesis. For instance, Germany (the universal banking case in 
point) has a higher equity-deposit ratio than the UK (the antithesis of 
universal banking). Verdier notes that there are a number of outliers, 
including the Netherlands. However, he is unable to come up with an 
explanation with which he is satisfied.61 There are three explanations that 
he arguably overlooked in the case of the Netherlands. (1) The 
prolongatie market is still strong around this time, so data for this should 
be included in the denominator, as it is a relatively liquid form of finance. 
(2) The year 1913 is not typical for the Netherlands as the bank 
concentration movement is getting underway and banks are issuing lots 
                                                 
60 Verdier, Moving Money: Banking and Finance in the Industrialized World, 113. 
61 Daniel Verdier, Universal Banking and Bank Failures between the Wars, EUI 
Working Paper No. 97/11. (1997), 26. 
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of new share capital as a result. If these two problems are addressed, the 
equity-deposit ratio is likely to be lower, but will probably still indicate 
universal rather than specialised. (3) The data used for the Netherlands 
only covers the Big Five banks, not the entire banking sector. But, as 
shown in Table 1, only 22.7 percent of total bank assets are held by these 
five institutions and many other – specialised – banks and credit 
cooperatives are operating in the country at the time. If these are added 
into the equation, the ratio may to be significantly lower. 
If Verdier’s figures are to be believed, then there are three further 
problems with his model. (4) Specialised banks remained in operation 
and the new universal banks did not dominate. (5) Dutch banks appear 
from the literature to have moved from deposit banking to investment 
banking, not the other way around. Finally, (6) the level of regulation of 
the banking sector appears to be minimal and the lack of explicit deposit 
insurance from the Nederlandsche Bank did not provide depositors with 
the necessary confidence in the system.62 Given the secondary literature 
on Dutch banking, the degree to which Verdier’s two conditions for 
universality are met is therefore unclear. However, despite the problems 
outlined above, his measure of universality is very intuitive and useful. It 
is developed further in Section 4.1 for cross-sectional time series data for 
the Big Five banks in order to get a better sense of the sector’s dynamics 
(or at least this part of the sector). 
 
 
                                                 
62 This may have contributed to the success of the prolongatie system, where depositor 
had a collateral should the borrower fail. Personal communication with Dr. Jonker, 1 
October 2006. 
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3.2 Banking Scope and Associated Crisis Risk in the Dutch 
Banking Sector 
Before proceeding, a definition of a financial crisis is in order. 
Michael Bordo’s characterisation of a financial crisis encompasses a very 
wide range of definitions present in the literature. His key ingredients 
are:63 (a) a widespread change in expectations; (b) fear of solvency of 
financial institutions; (c) an attempt to convert real and illiquid assets into 
money; (d) threat to solvency of sound commercial banks; (e) bank runs 
precipitated by these threats; (f) a reduction in money supply as a result 
of these bank runs; (g) a fall in real economic activity and general price 
level; (h) a decline in profits, and an increase in bankruptcies; (i) a debt 
crisis; and (j) the whole process arrested from the outset by timely 
intervention of some authority. There is much debate and different writers 
focus on different aspects of Bordo’s recipe. Monetarists have associated 
financial crises with bank runs.64 Others, such as Charles Kindleberger, 
hold a much broader definition.65 This paper adopts a broad definition, but 
pays particular attention to the bank run element of a crisis. 
As discussed elsewhere, a universal bank provides any one client 
with an entire range of financial services, from underwriting his securities, 
to holding deposits and savings, to offering insurance cover. It often owns 
(substantial quantities of) equity in its client firms and elects (or appoints) 
its employees as members of clients’ management or supervisory boards. 
At the other end of the spectrum lies functionally separated banking, 
                                                 
63 M. Bordo, "Financial Crises, Banking Crises, Stock Market Crashes and the Money 
Supply: Some International Evidence, 1870-1933," in Financial Crises and the World 
Banking System, ed. F. Capie, et al.,  (1986), 190-191. 
64 F. S. Mishkin, "Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical 
Perspective," in Financial Markets and Financial Crises, ed. R. G. Hubbard, et al.,  
(1991), 70. 
65 C. P. Kindleberger, Panics, Manias and Crashes, 4th ed. (2002), 13-16. 
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under which one firm is supplied financial services by a host of different 
specialised financial institutions, such as specialised investment banks.  
There is no overall consensus in the literature on the relationship 
between banking scope (the choice between universal and functionally 
separated banking) and financial crisis risk. On initial inspection, it may 
appear that universal banks have a lower risk of failure than their 
specialised competitors: they are highly diversified, often larger and 
arguably benefit from reduced information asymmetries.66 Significantly, 
they are able to internalise the effects of problems in one line of business 
by drawing on the resources of another. However, there are two potential 
problems with this ability: (1) the resulting lower versatility of universal 
banks during an economic downturn; and (2) the creation of a “dual 
market for lemons”67 resulting from information asymmetries between (a) 
borrowers and banks, and (b) depositors and banks. Each is addressed in 
turn below. The Dutch case is subsequently briefly examined in light of 
this discussion. 
(1) During an economic downturn, universal banks arguably suffer 
more than their functionally separated counterparts. Significant 
proportions of a universal bank’s assets are geared towards the long-term 
and are more difficult to liquidate in times of need. A bank run precipitated 
by some event68 may therefore have more serious consequences for a 
universal bank because it is unable to provide customers with their 
                                                 
66 With respect to information asymmetries, whilst specialised bankers may know 
detailed information about their segment of the market, universal bankers service many 
different sorts of client, and therefore know about more segments of the market. 
George J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The 
Glass-Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered (1990), 181-213. 
67 The term “market for lemons” originates from G. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons: 
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 
(1970). 
68 The arrival of nonbank-specific, aggregate, information that results in a sudden, but 
rational, revision in the perceived riskiness of bank deposits when information. Mishkin, 
"Asymmetric Information," 70-71. 
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deposits on such short notice. Meanwhile, specialist commercial banks 
are more able to meet consumer demand for deposit withdrawal, whilst 
specialist investment banks are less prone to bank runs because of the 
long-term relationships they have with their clients. A universal bank’s 
fragility could be further aggravated by questionable activities due to the 
presence of internal conflicts of interest. A bank that owns a significant 
share in a client firm – and even helps manage that firm – may be less 
willing to see the said client defaulting on loans, therefore fostering 
inefficiencies to the detriment of the bank’s shareholders and other 
clients.69
Of course, the above explanation negates the presence of central 
banks with lender-of-last-resort deposit insurance. The role of central 
banks in preventing and stopping crises is a complex issue. Whilst 
deposit-insurance reinforces public confidence in the financial system 
(making bank runs less probable ex ante), the certainty that deposits will 
be paid back regardless of the banks’ portfolio decisions may lead banks 
to take excessive risks (moral hazard), and depositors to be less 
concerned with the quality of different banks (adverse selection).70 If a 
crisis does occur, central banks may be more willing to bail out large 
universal banks than their specialist competitors because they may be 
judged to have a more significant impact on the development of the 
economy as a whole (they are “too big to fail”). 
(2) An adapted version of a new financial model developed by 
Arnoud Boot and Anjan Thakor is now used to address the dual market 
                                                 
69 Note that often universal banks only owned shares in their clients around the time of 
IPOs and did not have a long-term equity position in their clients. See Guinnane, 
"Delegated Monitors," 108. This fact, however, does not damage the argument 
developed here; if a bank engages in “repeated interaction” with a client over said 
client’s entire life-cycle, then a similarly “collusive” long-term relationship may ensue. 
70 R. N. Bebczuk, Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and 
Applications (2003), 124. 
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for lemons problem.71 The model has four key players: (a) commercial 
banks, (b) investment banks, (c) borrowers and (d) the financial market. 
Both bank types have a different raison d’être: whilst commercial banks 
specialise in post-lending monitoring to deter asset-substitution moral 
hazard, investment banks aim to minimise their borrowers’ cost of capital 
through capital markets. Hence borrowers face a trade-off between the 
advantages of bank financing (which lies in the bank’s ability to determine 
moral hazard) against the advantages of capital-market financing (which 
lies in the ability of capital markets to adapt to performance information 
through market price). If the severity of a borrower’s moral hazard is 
captured by a publicly observable quality attribute, there exists some 
quality cut-off point, below which borrowers approach commercial banks 
(the moral hazard problem is too severe and requires bank monitoring), 
and above which they approach investment banks. The actual design of 
the new financial “innovation” (a product of a certain type/length/breadth) 
affects this cut-off point endogenously: if investment banks can design a 
new product that reflects more accurately the borrower’s associated risk, 
then the cut-off will decrease. 
Comparing now directly the two types of bank system structures. If 
functionally separated, then each investment bank will choose its 
investment portfolio based on the cost of innovation relative to the 
expected increase in the fee revenue that comes from sharing in the 
borrower’s elevated payoff due to the innovation. But if universal, the 
                                                 
71 The exposition of this model draws freely from Arnoud W. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor, 
"Banking Scope and Financial Innovation," in New Research in Corporate Finance and 
Banking, ed. B. Biais, et al.,  (2002), 181-184. A similar, though less developed, line of 
argument can also be found in Guinnane, "Delegated Monitors." A similar line of 
argument is adopted by Caroline Fohlin in Chapter 3 of her forthcoming book on 
universal banking in pre-war Germany: C. Fohlin, Finance Capitalism and Germany's 
Rise to Industrial Power: Corporate Finance, Governance, and Performance from the 
1840s to the Present (forthcoming 2007). 
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investment-banking arm of the bank internalises the potential risks of 
financial innovation on the consumer base of the commercial-banking arm 
(the borrowers). The net result is that commercial clients with less risky 
portfolios may leave the market à la Akerlof’s market for lemons. Exit may 
continue until only the riskiest clients remain, hence making the universal 
bank more susceptible to bank runs. Hence, to compensate for this risk, 
the universal bank needs a higher expected profit from the innovation 
than does a functionally separated investment bank. The equilibrium level 
of financial innovation is therefore lower – and by extension the overall 
welfare effect is arguably lower – under universal banking vis-à-vis 
functionally separated banking.  
Note that Boot and Thakor argue that their model only works in 
systems that are very consolidated: a universal bank would not be able to 
significantly internalise its risks if it is a small operation. Hence in a very 
fragmented universal banking system, financial innovation may not be 
significantly discouraged.72 Interestingly, Boot and Thakor’s model 
predicts that functionally separated banks will be driven out of the market 
in which universal banks can operate.73 This is because stand-alone 
banks are competitively disadvantaged through absence of scale and 
scope economies (i.e. the positive economies of universal banks 
outweigh their associated increased risk of financial crises). 
Adding now a fifth player to the model: (e) depositors. In addition to 
the adverse selection between borrowers and banks, the asymmetry also 
works between depositors and banks. In a banking system without official 
central bank supervision, depositors may not be able to distinguish 
between solvent and insolvent banks. During a crisis situation they may 
therefore withdraw their deposits regardless, forcing otherwise sound 
                                                 
72 Such as that of the United States prior to Glass-Steagall. 
73 Boot and Thakor, "Banking Scope and Financial Innovation," 200-205. 
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banks into liquidation. This results in a second market for lemons, this 
time in banks themselves. The traditional literature argues that the risk of 
such a bank run is potentially higher in an environment with many small, 
undiversified, banks, whilst universal banks, inter-bank cooperation and 
branch banking could enable risks to be spread over a greater number of 
players.74 However, this is not necessarily true: regardless of actual risk, 
large universal banks may be more exposed compared to specialist 
commercial banks because of the higher perceived risk associated with 
their investment banking client base. 
The remainder of this section examines the exposure risk to 
financial crises of Dutch banks. The literature reviewed in Section 2 
suggests that the Dutch banking system appeared to become “more 
universal” following the decline of prolongatie, the bank concentration 
movement and increased industrial demand for credit. On the one hand 
this enabled her to benefit from reduced information asymmetries and 
provided her with greater scope to internalise risk. But on the other hand, 
such a structure may have exposed her to the two problems discussed 
above, addressed separately as follows. (1) If banks learn how to 
structure their liabilities so as to match their long-term assets, then they 
may be unaffected by an economic downturn. But from the secondary 
literature it appears that much of the Dutch sector was inexperienced: 
during the war and post-war inflationary booms, banks were keen to 
increase their assets and started over-lending, and were thus ill prepared 
for the sudden deflationary years 1920-1923.  
(2) Perhaps the Netherlands experienced a dual market for lemons 
situation. Newfound universality may have caused sound firms to exit the 
market, leaving only riskier crisis-prone clients behind. Similarly, sound 
                                                 
74 C. W. Calomiris and G. Gorton, "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and 
Bank Regulations," in Financial Markets and Financial Crises, ed. R. G. Hubbard, et al.,  
(1991), 124, 117. 
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banks may have been forced out of the market, leaving only their riskier 
competitors. However, to what extent this dual market existed in the 
Dutch case is not clear from the secondary literature. Looking at 
bankruptcy figures alone (Table 2) is not sufficient; the underlying cause 
of the increase in bank bankruptcies over the period 1921-1925 must be 
ascertained. To what degree Boot and Thakor’s concentrated markets 
prerequisite is fulfilled is also unclear.75 An alternative explanation is that 
the crisis was the result of an absence of an experienced central bank 
with formal market oversight, not the sector’s structure per se. Note also 
that the model’s prediction regarding the market exit of functionally 
separated banks is not supported by the Dutch case, as a great deal of 
specialised institutions remained.  
Of course, a correlation between bank structure type and crisis 
occurrence does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. It may not be 
the sector’s new structure that caused the crisis, but rather a collection of 
factors, some of which related to her new structure, but others of which 
are exogenous to the system (such as the effect of German 
hyperinflation). Further empirical work is therefore required in order to 
determine to what degree the structure was the cause of the sector’s 
problems, a discussion that is conspicuously absent from the current 
literature on Dutch banking.76 Section 4 attempts to go some way towards 
addressing this in the case of one bank in the Dutch crisis. 
 
 
4.  A Tale of Two banks: Different Systems, Different Impact 
The previous section reviewed the Dutch financial system in two 
different ways. First it examined the evolution of the system. 
                                                 
75 That is, does the Big Five’s 26.6 percent share of all assets in 1918 satisfy Verdier’s 
concentration condition (see UTable 1)? 
76 Personal communication with Dr. Jonker, 7 March 2006. 
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Subsequently it examined which type of banking system minimises the 
risk of financial crises. Thus far, the analysis of the Dutch banking sector 
has been along very general lines. But it is important to note that there 
was much variation within the sector. Some banks embraced the 
universal model more enthusiastically than others. Some banks fared 
badly during the crisis, whilst others escaped relatively unscathed. 
Following the crisis, some banks abandoned their universal policy 
immediately, whilst others clung on for a while longer. 
This section looks at some of this variation within the sector. It 
presents a matched pair comparison of how two similar-sized Dutch 
banks fared in the 1920s crisis. These banks are the Rotterdamsche 
Bankvereeniging (henceforth the RBV), and the Amsterdamsche Bank 
(henceforth the AB). The literature suggests that the bank that fared badly 
– the RBV – had enthusiastically adopted a universal banking policy 
under the stewardship of her director Willem Westerman, whilst the bank 
that escaped the crisis unscathed – the AB – had a much more 
conservative policy outlook. This section tests whether there is a link 
between universal banking policy and banking stability in this case. 
This section proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 examines whether 
the literature’s characterisation of the banking industry in general, and 
these two competing banks in particular, is accurate by: (1) measuring the 
universality of the banking sector as a whole and the AB and RBV in 
particular; and (2) surveying (other) differences and similarities between 
the two banks. Section 4.2 then analyses the asymmetries in information 
that existed between the creditors, debtors, managers and regulators of 
the two banks on the one hand, and the general public on the other hand, 
in the build-up, climax and immediate aftermath of the crisis. It uses 
internal meeting notes and letters from different layers of management 
from the archive of the ABN AMRO bank – the two banks’ legal successor 
– and through the analysis of contemporary newspaper articles. It then 
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attempts to test the theories discussed in Section 3 using the new 
evidence presented here in Section 4. 
  
4.1 Measuring the Universality of the Dutch Banking Sector 
As discussed in Section 2, the Dutch banking sector arguably 
experienced a revolution in the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
Banks expanded in number and in size, established branch networks, and 
merged with one another. They also started to forge closer ties with 
industry, especially following the outbreak of war in neighbouring 
countries. But the literature is unclear to what degree these algemene 
banks were truly universal, i.e. to what extent commercial and investment 
banking services were combined. Jonker argues that the scale of the 
universal banking experiment is illustrated by the increase in banks’ 
representation on supervisory boards of companies (200 interlocks in 
1910, and 431 in 1923), a large part of which was due to the RBV (where 
interlocks exploded from 30 in 1910 to 127 in 1923).77, 78 However, 
relative to the increased size of the banking system, this rise in non-
executive directorships is perhaps less impressive. And there is also likely 
to be a lag between changes to the structure of a bank’s balance sheet 
and the appointment of directorships. A more instantaneously responsive 
measure of universality would therefore be helpful. This section explores 
two such measures: (1) ascertaining the range of client and service types 
provided by the banks; and (2) developing a quantitative measure of 
                                                 
77 Jonker, "Sinecures or Sinews of Power?," 162.  
78 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röell look in detail at the phenomenon of interlocking 
directorships in the Netherlands for three sample years (1923, 1958 and 1993). They 
find that in 1923, the proportion of non-financial exchange-listed firms with no bank 
interlocks was 40 percent, whilst 22 percent had one interlock, 12 percent had two, 8 
percent had three, and 18 per cent had more than three. Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röell, 
"Financing and Control in the Netherlands: A Historical Perspective," in A History of 
Corporate Governance around the World. Family Business Groups to Professional 
Managers (2005), 495. 
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universality using consolidated bank balance sheets, the equity-deposit 
ratio.  
But before proceeding with measuring universality, a brief survey of 
some key differences and similarities between the two banks is 
considered. The motivation for this is as follows: merely noting a 
correlation between bank structure and crisis occurrence is not sufficient 
to determine causality. In an ideal matched-pair analysis there is one 
single significant difference between members of the sample. It must be 
determined to what degree this is true when comparing the AB with the 
RBV. There may be other, perhaps more important, factors involved. The 
survey examines five themes: (1) early history; (2) the Amsterdam-
Rotterdam rivalry; (3) the overall size of the banking operations; (4) their 
organisational structures; and (5) their branching strategy. 
(1) The Rotterdamsche Bank – the RBV’s main predecessor – was 
created in 1863 by a group of Rotterdam businessmen, including the 
prominent Jewish family Müller. It aimed to support Dutch trade with the 
her colonies in the East Indies, and to do so provided cheap credit to 
trade and industry in and outside of the Netherlands.79 However, this 
early (unsuccessful) foray into investment banking was soon abandoned, 
and the bank refocused its attentions on traditional banking services to 
customers predominantly based in Rotterdam.80 It was not until the 1911 
merger that created the RBV81 – and the subsequent takeover of the 
Amsterdam securities bank Determeyer Westlingh & Zoon in 191382 – 
that the bank ventured seriously into the business of long-term industrial 
                                                 
79 Joh. de Vries et al., eds., Worldwide Banking: ABN AMRO Bank 1824-1999 (1999), 
129. 
80 J. Jonker, "The Alternative Road to Modernity: Banking and Currency, 1814-1914," in 
A Financial History of the Netherlands, ed. M. t. Hart, et al.,  (1997), 116. 
81 Between the Rotterdamsche Bank and the Deposito- en Administratiebank (a 
Rotterdam-based securities firm). 
82 Which had a seat on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
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finance. Meanwhile, the AB was established in 1871 and aimed to serve 
as an instrument in bonding the Dutch and German money markets. 
Amsterdam was the Netherlands’ financial centre, and in its early days 
the AB was more active in the business of new securities than the RBV.83  
(2) A famous rivalry between the cities of Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam had existed for hundreds of years. This primarily concerned 
the two cities’ positions in foreign trade (a battle that Amsterdam was 
loosing), but had long turned into a cultural phenomenon. The AB and the 
RBV were seen as bitter rivals. In response to the creation and expansion 
of RBV, the AB raised its equity capital in 1912, and again in 1913. And in 
retaliation to the RBV’s escapade into Amsterdam, the AB opened up 
operations in Rotterdam.84 However, despite the very visible signals of 
rivalry, it is unclear how fierce the competition actually was between the 
two banks. Indeed, during the 1930s the pair made plans to merge their 
operations.85 But this plan was abandoned following the outbreak of war 
in 1939. The nature of the banks’ relationship likely changed as a 
consequence of the crisis at the RBV, to be discussed in the next section. 
(3) Both banking operations are not the same size. Their relative 
positions swap twice. Table 4 below provides an overview of the activities 
of the AB and RBV for a selection of years. Up until the merger that 
created the RBV, the AB was the larger of the two banks. The AB made a 
bigger accounting profit, and provided a higher return for her investors. 
Following the mergers, the RBV becomes the bigger of the two 
institutions. Despite her making a bigger profit, her returns on equity 
remain below that of her Amsterdam rival. This is also true after the 
conclusion of the war, in 1919. This is likely explained by the RBV’s 
                                                 
83 De Vries et al., eds., Worldwide Banking: ABN AMRO Bank 1824-1999, 133-135. 
84 Ibid. 
85 European Association for Banking History, Handbook on the History of European 
Banks (1994), 755. 
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decision to issue new share capital. 1924, the year of the crisis at the 
RBV, sees a swap in the position of the two banks; the balance total of 
the RBV is significantly reduced, whilst that of the AB remains relatively 
unchanged.  
 
 
Table 4. Activities of the Rival Banks, 1900-1929 (in thousands of 
guilders) 
Balance 
totals
Gross 
profit 
equity (in 
%)
Balance 
totals
Gross 
profit 
equity (in 
%)
1900 28600 738 9.32 23270 488 6.80
1905 44600 894 10.55 22110 464 6.38
1910 51570 1296 10.61 30460 778 8.27
1913 86570 1863 7.80 123410 2609 6.93
1919 456740 9950 13.33 608370 17910 1.71
1924 423740 5830 5.98 288860 5170 7.38
1929 440860 7280 7.26 386210 2730 3.90
Amsterdamsche Bank Rotterdamsche Bank(vereeniging)
 
Source: Vries, Joh. de, et al. eds. Worldwide Banking: ABN AMRO Bank 1824-1999, 
1999, 133, 136, 256, 263 
 
 
(4) Both banks had similar management structures, namely a dual 
management board comprising a College van Commissarissen (a non-
executive directors committee/supervisory board), and a directie (the 
executive managers/directors). Despite this similarity, the secondary 
literature argues that both bank’s management mentality was different, 
with the RBV willing to take greater risks than the AB.86 The different 
                                                 
86 e.g. with respect to the RBV’s expansion, Willem Westerman, the RBV’s president, 
was even known in the press as Willem de Veroveraar (William the Conqueror). De 
Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 41. 
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mentality could be a symptom of location. Whilst the AB is headquartered 
in the Netherlands’ financial centre, Rotterdam is arguably in the 
periphery.87 Whilst Rotterdam takes the lead from industry (which is 
risky), Amsterdam engages in more conservative activities using 
traditional financial markets. From an analysis of internal board papers of 
the RBV in the next section, it is clear that there is an additional factor at 
play: the powerbase of the AB appears to have been centralised around 
her Amsterdam head office, whilst that of the RBV was very split between 
her Rotterdam and Amsterdam branches.88
(5) The AB and RBV both expanded their branch network over the 
first decades of the twentieth century, although in different ways and to 
different degrees.89 Whilst the AB established its branches itself, the RBV 
expanded through acquisition. The AB’s branches, which were all named 
after the parent bank, were run as subsidiaries of the main Amsterdam 
headquarters. The RBV’s acquisitions, on the other hand, were 
incorporated into a new subsidiary bank, the Nationale Bankvereeniging 
(NBV), which until 1929 was run as a separate entity to its parent bank, 
and was headquartered in Utrecht.  
Returning now to the issue of universality. One obvious method of 
determining universality is to examine closely the banks’ different clients, 
and the services provided to them. However, this is not straightforward in 
this case for three reasons: (1) large parts of the RBV’s archives were 
destroyed during the German bombing campaign on Rotterdam just prior 
                                                 
87 Personal communication with Prof. Van Zanden, 7 April 2006. 
88 There is also a further management issue to consider: the effect of new office 
mechanisation in the form of punch card technology which was introduced at the RBV’s 
Amsterdam office in the early 1920s. This apparently coincided with the adoption of 
new systematic management procedures. See O. de Wit and J. van den Ende. "The 
Emergence of a New Regime: Business Management and Office Mechanisation in the 
Dutch Financial Sector in the 1920s." Business History  42 (2000), 87-118. 
89 De Vries et al., eds., Worldwide Banking: ABN AMRO Bank 1824-1999, 254-257. 
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to the capitulation of the Netherlands in the Second World War;90 (2) like 
many businesses, there appeared to be limited interest in company 
history for much of the banks’ existence; and (3) when the two banks’ 
archives were consolidated following the merger that created the ABN 
AMRO bank in the 1990s, they were significantly reduced in size; 
approximately five percent of all dossiers relating to the banks’ creditors 
remain.91 Despite these problems, many creditor files remain and 
analysing these is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Some other insightful sources have survived, including the meeting 
minutes the directie. For the RBV these contain reports on the bank’s 
current activities, their associated risks, ventures abroad, and discussions 
of whether to take on new clients. However, it is difficult to ascertain the 
range of clients from this source because it tends to focus on large 
clients, new clients and failing clients. For the AB these minutes are 
considerably less detailed and note only brief management decisions, 
and none of the discussions that led to these. A comparison using this 
source is therefore not possible. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, Verdier develops a quantitative 
measure of universality using aggregate bank balance sheet data: the 
equity-deposit ratio. Verdier calculates this ratio for a cross-section of the 
aggregate balances of the major banks of 16 countries in 1913. The same 
methodology is used here to calculate the ratios for a panel of the Big 
                                                 
90 With the destruction of the bank’s headquarters on the Boompjes in May 1940, the 
majority of the bank’s archive from the first eighty years of her existence was lost. 
Materials in the archive from before 1940 originate primarily from the branch in The 
Hague. D. J. Wijmer et al., Inventaris van het Archief van de Rotterdamsche Bank N.V., 
1863-1964. 
91 The selection criteria concerned the type of client (with respect to size and sector), 
and also special cases (such as Jewish clients and the war period). D. J. Wijmer et al., 
Inventaris van het Archief van de Amsterdamsche Bank N.V., 1871-1964. 
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Five Dutch banks for the period 1911-1931.92 The data is taken from a 
compilation volume of the balance sheets of the Netherlands’ money-
lending financial institutions and savings banks for the period 1900-1945 
constructed for the Nederlandsche Bank in 1972.93 The numerator is the 
sum of the balance items kapitaal (capital) and gepubliceerde reserves 
(published reserves), and the denominator is the item deposito’s 
(deposits). The Big Five do not appear to hold savings – perhaps due to 
the prevalence of specialist savings banks – and so this is absent from 
the denominator.94  
A further item that could be considered very liquid and therefore 
part of the denominator is the item voor derden op prolongatie 
(prolongatie held for third parties). But this was excluded because the 
data was not available for all the banks, nor for all years. This omission is 
perhaps problematic: despite the declining importance of prolongatie, it 
was still an important form of credit in the earlier years of the sample. An 
Appendix to this paper reports the raw data used in the construction of 
the ratio, in addition to the ratio series themselves. 
Figure 2 (below) is a graphical representation of a sub-set of the 
series: the period 1916-1930. Omitting the first five years from the sample 
should reduce the problems associated with (1) the omission of 
prolongatie data from the denominator (by 1916 this market is less 
important); and (2) the one-time effect of the RBV merger (with respect to 
its issuance of new share capital on the stock exchange). The figure 
shows that the Big Five on aggregate hold a greater proportion of their 
                                                 
92 1911 is chosen as the starting date because it is the first year in which data for all the 
Big Five is available, following the merger that created the RBV. 
93 Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van Amsterdam. "Eerste 
Rapport: Geldscheppende Instellingen en Spaarbanken." Amsterdam: University of 
Amsterdam, 1972. 
94 Any savings that are held are probably included as part of the deposito’s balance 
item. 
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assets in least liquid form, suggesting an industry-wide universal 
structure. The industry experiences the height of universality between 
1921 and 1924, after which there is a reversal, with the ratio falling below 
parity following the onset of international depression in 1929.95
Note, however, that there is considerable difference within the 
sample. The RBV had a consistently high equity-deposit ratio throughout, 
especially when compared with the rest of the Big Five. She experienced 
a large rise in the ratio during both episodes of the crisis: 1921 and 1924. 
After the crisis, the RBV’s ratio fell quite rapidly towards the industry 
average. Meanwhile, the AB, whilst operating an overall universal balance 
sheet, was consistently “less universal” than her Rotterdam rival. 
However, the AB was not the sample’s “least universal” bank; this honour 
goes to the I-B. Overall, the results arguably confirm the literature’s 
assertion that the RBV adopted a universal model more enthusiastically 
than the comparatively conservative AB. 
 
 
95 Note that this may be the result of either a conscious switch to universalism, or 
alternatively simply the effect of incautious over-lending powered by inflationary 
pressures and ballooning liquidity (as discussed briefly in section 3.2). Personal 
communication with Dr. Jonker , 1 October 2006. 
Key: AB = Amsterdamsche Bank; RBV = Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging; I-B = Incasso-Bank; TB = Twentsche Bank; NHMa = 
Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij 
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Figure 2. Equity-Deposit Ratio for the Big Five Dutch Banks, 1916-1930 
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Source: See text
 
This section sought to measure the level of universality of the AB 
and RBV relative to each other and the rest of the Big Five. The first 
methodology – the examination of board papers and client files – was not 
successful due to archival difficulties and time limitations. Although the 
second methodology – the equity-deposit ratio – was successful in that it 
provides an instant overview of the evolution of both banks, it is still 
problematic. In addition to the issues identified previously, two further 
problems are outlined as follows. (1) Can a bank’s policy with regards to 
universality really be as volatile as Figure 2 suggests? Policy change 
takes time to implement, especially with regards to long-term clients. (2) 
What is the overall yardstick by which a bank is considered universal? If 
Germany’s equity deposit ratio for 1913 is 0.73 (see Table 3), then surely 
the whole of the Dutch sector remains very universal throughout the 
sample? 
This section has also outlined some of the other differences and 
similarities between the AB and RBV that may be responsible for – or at 
least contribute towards – the 1924 crisis. Themes (4) and (5) of the 
review are particularly pertinent and can be used to construct a plausible 
alternative hypothesis for the cause of the 1924 crisis: general bad 
management due to a combination of the RBV’s disjointed relationship 
between her two main branches and the distant relationship with her NBV 
branch network. However, this raises the issue of reverse causality; 
universality could plausibly be both the cause and symptom of the bank’s 
management style. The following section, Section 4.2, will examine this 
alternative hypothesis, and the issue of reverse causality, in more detail in 
light of a narrative of the crisis reconstructed from a variety of primary 
sources. 
The analysis of this section has not measured Verdier’s “inputs” 
(liquidity guarantee and market segmentation), only the observed “output” 
(the degree of universality). As a result, Verdier’s hypothesis on the 
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evolution of financial systems cannot be explicitly tested here and will 
therefore remain a topic for future research. Unfortunately this paper 
therefore fails to explore further her first main question concerning 
financial systems evolution. 
 
4.2 A Failed Love Affair with Universalism? 
The previous section analysed to what extent the Dutch banking sector 
was universal during the 1910s and 1920s. In general agreement with the 
literature, but with some discussed provisos, it found that the large Dutch 
banks became “more universal” in their service provision over the period, 
and that the RBV was “more universal” still than the AB. Section 4.2.1 
examines in detail the events of 1924, the year in which the RBV was 
compelled to seek assistance from the Nederlandsche Bank and after 
which new senior management was installed, including a caretaker chief 
executive director previously employed by the AB. It examines this crisis 
from two separate points of view: (1) internally, through the analysis of 
board papers and letters;96 and (2) externally, primarily using commentary 
from De Kroniek (The Chronicle), a respected contemporary bi-weekly 
financial journal published in Amsterdam and edited by Dr A. Sternheim.97 
The events of the crisis will be described in chronological order from mid 
1922 (shortly after the conclusion of the first wave of bank failures) to the 
end of 1924.  
Following this narrative, Section 4.2.2 then addresses this paper’s 
second main question: whether there is a relationship between a financial 
                                                 
96 The minutes referred to here are of the following three layers of the RBV’s 
management: (1) the weekly meetings of the College van Commissarissen; (2) the 
weekly meetings of the Commissie uit Commissarissen, after 1924 known as the 
Comité en Directie, a sub-committee of non-executive directors plus managing 
directors of the bank; and (3) the frequent meetings of the directie. 
97 From 1926 this journal was renamed after its editor: De Kroniek van Dr. A. Sternheim 
(Sternheim’s Chronicle). 
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system’s structure and risk of financial crises. The effects of the 
differences and similarities between the AB and the RBV, as discussed in 
the previous section, are again considered. The working hypothesis is 
that the RBV’s universal scope was the cause of her difficulties. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the bank’s problems were due to general 
bad management. The section settles for a middle ground: the bank’s 
crisis was caused by general bad management that can be primarily 
attributed to her universal structure.  
 
4.2.1 A Narrative of the 1924 Crisis 
Before proceeding with an account of the crisis, some of its primary 
protagonists are introduced. Key leaders of the RBV were (1) Willem 
Westerman, who was installed as an RBV bank director in 1904 and 
made her president in 1908, and who presided over the bank’s 
expansionary policy, (2) J. P. van Tienhoven and (3) K. P. van der 
Mandele, both of who were brought to the RBV by Westerman as bank 
directors in 1916, and finally (4) Y. J. H. van der Meulen, another of the 
bank’s directors. Meanwhile, at the AB an important figure in the narrative 
is (5) Arie J. van Hengel, one of that bank’s directors. Key players in 
government include: (6) Gerard Vissering, president of the 
Nederlandsche Bank, and (7) Hendrikus Colijn, minister of state for 
finances. Crucial in the story is also the role of (8) Anton G. Kröller, who 
was simultaneously managing director of Wm. H. Müller & Co. N.V. – a 
trading, shipbuilding and mining concern that had experienced 
considerable expansion during the post-war boom – and an RBV 
commissaris (non-executive director). 
The narrative starts with an early example of the RBV’s easy 
industrial credit policy and internal management conflict between different 
branches of the bank. At the weekly bank directors meeting of 2 
November 1922 there is a lively discussion about Westerman’s recent 
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unilateral decision to guarantee a new loan of US$3 million to Müller & 
Co. for its American cereal operations from the Amsterdam branch of the 
RBV.98 Van der Meulen, who operates out of the Rotterdam branch of the 
RBV, seems angry that he was only informed about this loan after it had 
already been issued. He argues that in future all directors should be 
consulted over such large loans. He is concerned about the financial risks 
Müller & Co. are taking and their impact on the liquidity of the bank as a 
whole. Van Tienhoven and Van der Mandele do not appear to share Van 
der Meulen’s grievances. 
The narrative continues with a look at RBV operations from an 
external perspective. In the fifth issue of the newly created De Kroniek, 
published on 16 May 1923, concern is voiced about the latest company 
accounts filed by the RBV.99 The article argues that the bank looks like 
the most vulnerable in the sector. It speculates that her problems are 
caused by: (1) the downward business cycle in general; and (2) clients in 
shipping and mining in particular. The article criticises the RBV for not 
including her obligations towards her NBV subsidiary. It is also apparently 
difficult to tell from her accounts why the bank’s profits are reduced 
compared to previous years. Meanwhile, the newspaper’s opinion of the 
AB is very positive. She is described as ‘the best led and […] strongest of 
our banks’.100
Returning to a view from the inside, with another indication of 
management difficulties. On 11 September 1923, Westerman tells his 
fellow directors that he feels that he has recently been left out of the loop 
in the decisions to take on new business. The minutes read: ‘If he 
[Westerman] had sole say, many unwanted credits would not have been 
                                                 
98 Minutes of the Directie meeting, 2 November 1922 
99 ‘Balans-Analyse: Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging’, De Kroniek, 16 May 1923, 28-29 
100 Author’s translation, ‘De Amsterdamsche Bank: Buitengewone positie’, De Kroniek, 
2 May 1923, 11-12 
 
44
issued’.101 To tackle the apparent un-coordination and lack of 
communication between the bank’s Rotterdam and Amsterdam branches, 
Westerman proposes to increase the importance of the national 
directiecentrale (management centre), housed in the newly built branch of 
the RBV at the Kneuterdijk in The Hague. All accounting functions are to 
be moved to this single branch, instead of the current arrangement 
whereby the Rotterdam and Amsterdam branches operate almost 
independently of one another. 
The following month, on 4 October, considerable time is spent 
discussing the state of affairs at Compañia Mercentil Argentina, a trading 
company operating out of Buenos Aires in which Müller & Co. appears to 
have a large stake. The minutes record the objections of an RBV director, 
Ornstein: ‘[…] every year our position worsens. Every year our losses 
increase and the chance of making a profit grows smaller. Does this really 
weigh positively against better possible returns in the long term?’102 The 
directors decide to grant the firm a temporary loan using its Hollandsche 
Bank subsidiary as a front, and to issue Müller & Co. with an ultimatum to 
reduce the risks of its South American operations. Bank director Van der 
Vorm proposes a change to the bank’s statutes that would force a greater 
cooperation between the RBV’s directors and her commissarissen – of 
which Müller & Co. director Kröller is one – in order to tackle similar 
problems in the future. Westerman disagrees, as this would send out 
negative signals about the bank to the public. He wishes to handle the 
matter more informally.103
Müller & Co. is not the RBV’s only problematic client; the shipping 
conglomerate Furness-Stokvis is the subject of much discussion at the 
                                                 
101 Author’s translation, Minutes of the Directie meeting, 11 September 1923 
102 Author’s translation, Ibid., 4 October 1923 
103 The record of this loan arguably disproves Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röel’s assertion 
that the RBV did not issue loans to the firms with which it had management interlocks. 
Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röell, "Financing and Control in the Netherlands", 492. 
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monthly meetings of the commissarissen, an example of which is found 
on 19 March 1924.104 Van Tienhoven reports problems at one of the 
firm’s subsidiary companies that places the RBV in a ‘less than pleasant’ 
position. Shortly after this meeting, an article in De Kroniek describes 
Furness-Stokvis’s plan to solve her problems by reducing the concern’s 
share capital by 10 percent as ‘naïve and fantastical’.105
Despite the bank’s internal worries, the publication of the RBV’s 
1923 annual report to shareholders published in May 1924 reads on the 
whole upbeat, blaming the bank’s ‘minor problems’ on the economic 
cycle.106 The report apparently passed through the bank’s layers of 
management with little opposition: her commissarissen passed a draft 
with just minor corrections at their meeting on 23 April.107 A 4.5 million-
guilder dividend was paid to ordinary shareholders. Meanwhile, De 
Kroniek is not overly convinced with the bank’s upbeat tone, noting that 
the bank remains to kick her habit of inflating her figures.108 The article 
complains that it is very difficult to determine the strength of the concern 
from the outside because of problems with the way her figures are 
reported: again, the RBV’s NBV subsidiary is not included in the 
accounts, and some items that have previously always been noted on the 
RBV balance sheet – including her pension fund – have now mysteriously 
disappeared. The article estimates that of the bank’s reported 36.5 million 
guilders of reserves, 20 million are in the form of shares in industry. With 
a further reported 18.4 million in shares in other financial institutions, the 
article argues that the reserves are not very liquid and disposable and 
                                                 
104 Minutes of College van Commissarissen meeting, 19 March 1924 
105 ‘Balans-Analyse: Furness-Stokvis’, De Kroniek, 26 March 1924, 378-379 
106 1923 Annual Report of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging 
107 Minutes of College van Commissarissen meeting, 23 April 1924 
108 ‘Balans-Analyse: Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging’, De Kroniek, 7 May 1924, 426-
428 
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that their function ‘as a guarantee for profitability is limited’.109 The journal 
is worried about the risk of the bank’s shareholding portfolio. It questions 
how the bank is financing her dividend. It concludes that ‘only a very 
positive upswing in the business cycle that increases the bank’s 
profitability can stabilise her position’.110
The RBV crisis proper plays out over the summer of 1924. On 12 
May, within a month of issuing a dividend, the minutes of the directors 
meeting state that ‘the Nederlandsche Bank shall open a special 
emergency overdraft account for us using promissory notes of various of 
our illiquid debtors as collateral’.111 Further details about this account are 
discussed at the meeting on 15 May of the newly created Comité – an 
extra layer of management created by Westerman and consisting of the 
bank’s directors and a few of her commissarissen (note that Kröller was 
not made a member of this body).112 The meeting’s minutes state that the 
directors are not reassured by the tone of the Nederlandsche Bank’s 
correspondence. One director notes that ‘rigorous steps’ need to be taken 
in order to increase the liquidity of the RBV. A list of problematic clients 
that need to be addressed in urgency includes Furness-Stokvis and 
Müller & Co. The notes argue that a mere transfer of some of Müller & 
Co.’s loans to other banks is not sufficient, and that a more permanent 
solution needs to be found that addresses the root cause of the concern’s 
difficulties.113
By the time of the next directors meeting on 26 May, Van 
Tienhoven has visited the Nederlandsche Bank to make formal 
                                                 
109 Author’s translation, Ibid., 427 
110 Author’s translation, Ibid., 428 
111 Author’s translation, Minutes of the Directie meeting, 12 May 1924 
112 Minutes of the Comité en Directie meeting, 21 May 1924 
113 Aside from Müller & Co.’s problematic business activities, the concern was also 
used by Kröller and his wife as a source for funding their growing art collection. 
Personal communication with Dr. Jonker, 1 October 2006. 
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arrangements for the emergency loan, which is to amount to some 35 
million guilders.114 At this point in the negotiations the Furness-Stokvis 
account appears to have been left out of the equation, and the loan is 
designed to cover German cereal credits and the Müller & Co. and the 
Compañia Mercentil accounts only. Meanwhile, the main branches of the 
bank in Rotterdam and Amsterdam appear to have been busy ridding 
themselves of bad loans. However, one of the directors warns that they 
have now exhausted this avenue of increasing liquidity. The directors 
decide that they are to inform Furness-Stokvis that they wish to cease 
any further dealings with that company. 
Two days later, on 28 May, RBV management plans a drastic 
course of action aimed at restoring public confidence in the bank during a 
meeting of the Comité. An annex to the meeting minutes, marked as ‘very 
confidential’, discusses how as a consequence of adverse media 
attention, mistrust in the bank has reached such heights that it has 
caused incredible downward pressure on the RBV’s share price, which in 
time could have very serious consequences.115 Westerman tells his fellow 
directors that the public, and especially the Amsterdam stock exchange, 
blame him and Van Tienhoven personally for the bank’s state of affairs. 
Van Tienhoven then informs the directors that he has decided to resign 
from his post to act as the ‘peace offering’ that the public demands.116 
Westerman’s plan is to then call an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) 
of shareholders in August, at which the position of bank president will be 
abolished. Instead the bank will be lead by a new body, a Raad van 
Toezicht (RvT, translates to overseeing council). Westerman would then 
swap his current position for that of joint president of the commissarissen 
and RvT. In Westerman’s opinion, the key difference compared tot the 
                                                 
114 Minutes of the Directie meeting, 26 May 1924 
115 Minutes of the Comité en Directie meeting, 28 May 1924 
116 Author’s translation, Ibid. 
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status quo will be that management of the bank would be led by 
consensus: Westerman would have members of the RvT constantly 
around him for advice. However, there is some discussion in the meeting 
as to whether the public would perceive it in this way, as essentially the 
same individuals would remain in charge, although in different guises. 
Other directors are worried that the dual resignation would have the 
opposite effect to that that is intended. They argue that such an 
announcement could lead to further adverse share price fluctuations. 
Westerman presents his plan, now agreed upon by the directors, at 
a specially convened meeting of the commissarissen on 5 June. He 
informs these non-executive directors, among whom Kröller, that ‘recently 
he is under the impression that it is not going well with the bank, 
especially in Amsterdam’.117 There is much discussion whether the 
proposed course of action is dangerous so short after the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) held the previous month. Director Ornstein informs the 
commissarissen that only after the AGM did the true state of affairs with 
the bank’s ‘dubious creditors’ come to light. The bank’s directors inform 
the commissarissen that the RBV has been forced to buy up 2.6 million 
guilders of her own shares in order to stabilise the share price. They 
argue, and the commissarissen appear to agree, that Westerman’s plan 
should be implemented, as further share price support is unsustainable. A 
week later, at the 12 June Comité meeting, the minutes read that the 
bank’s liquidity still ‘leaves something to be desired’.118 Müller & Co. and 
Furness-Stokvis are again fingered as the culprits. Details of Van 
Tienhoven’s resignation, which is planned for 15 June, are outlined. 
There is discussion of a rumour circulating at the stock exchange that 
Westerman is to resign, which can be ‘positively denied’. 
                                                 
117 Author’s translation, Minutes of College van Commissarissen meeting, 5 June 1924 
118 Author’s translation, Minutes of the Comité en Directie meeting, 12 June 1924 
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On 16 June De Kroniek publishes the news of Van Tienhoven’s 
resignation as director. The accompanying comment praises his time at 
the RBV: 
The change in position of Mr Van Tienhoven is undoubtedly one of 
the most important occurrences in the area of banking in recent times. 
From 1912, and especially during the war, Mr Van Tienhoven has been 
the most important driving force behind the bank merger movement and 
in the finance of domestic industry. His work in the reorganisation of 
provincial bank business has been of great importance for our country, 
both directly and indirectly.119
However, Van Tienhoven’s resignation proves insufficient to calm 
markets. A month later, on 1 July 1924, the Nederlandsche Bank makes 
the following communiqué available to the press: 
The various rumours concerning the financial position of the 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging have motivated the directors of this 
institution to turn to the president of the Nederlandsche Bank, whom they 
are providing with all materials regarding the liquidity of the 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging. 
Following an examination of the provided materials, the president 
of the Nederlandsche Bank has proclaimed that he is prepared to work 
with the directors of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, and if 
necessary to maintain her liquidity. 120
There is a strange absence of records of directors meetings in the 
immediate build-up to the publishing of the above communiqué. From De 
Vries’s account of the RBV crisis, which makes use of the personal 
diaries of some of the bank’s directors (but not the sources used here), it 
appears that these meetings were held in private at the homes of 
directors and were not minuted. Interestingly, De Vries notes that a group 
of RBV directors initially approached Nederlandsche Bank president 
Vissering with news of the bank’s problems without Westerman’s 
                                                 
119 Author’s translation, ‘Mr. Dr. J. P. van Tienhoven’, De Kroniek, 16 June 1924, 472 
120 Author’s translation, ‘De Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging: Onder curateele’, De 
Kroniek, 1 July 1924, 488-489 
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knowledge.121 Later, on 30 June, and now in the presence of Westerman, 
Vissering arranged 50 million guilders of support for the RBV, under 
guarantee from finance minister Colijn. De Vries argues that Colijn does 
not initially wish to lend support to the RBV share price, only to stand 
guarantee for the bank’s bad debt. But Westerman apparently later 
convinces him to increase government support by an additional 10 million 
guilders with which to buy up RBV stock.122
At the time of the communiqué, the public appeared to be 
completely in the dark about the goings on in the finance ministry. De 
Kroniek wonders why the RBV itself did not publish the news, instead of 
the Nederlandsche Bank.123 The article returns to the point it made in the 
May that dividends should never have been paid to shareholders. The 
article asks how the Nederlandsche Bank is able to finance its possible 
intervention and speculates that the government is involved. If so, it 
argues that the government may have surpassed its mandate and that its 
actions could have a negative effect on the economy in the form of 
inflation. 
Westerman explains in detail the chain of events that led to the 
Nederlandsche Bank’s intervention and the published communiqué at the 
next meeting of commissarissen on 10 July (see Figure 3 for an extract of 
the original handwritten minutes of this meeting):  
Towards the end of June the supply of our shares was increased 
in such quantities, that the directors did not dare to buy up.  After a 
discussion with the Comité, they [the directors] decided to call in help 
from the Nederlandsche Bank, whom declared willing to help in principle, 
but required further discussion with the government before a firm 
commitment could be made. […] The Minister [Colijn] declared that it was 
in the interest of the nation to avoid a catastrophe, and that he was 
therefore willing to support the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging with a 
substantial sum. […] there was talk with the Nederlandsche Bank about a 
                                                 
121 De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 249. 
122 Ibid., 252. 
123 ‘De Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging: Onder curateele’, op. cit.  
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f 100,000,000 support, but the Nederlandsche Bank is to limit her support 
to 50,000,000 for the mean time, and that support for the share price, 
about which the Minister had shown support, was not on the table. In 
return the Nederlandsche Bank demanded the publication of a 
communiqué in the newspapers, which our directors conceded to under 
pressure. This communiqué was published in the morning papers of 
Tuesday 2 July, with the well-known disastrous consequences.124
The disastrous consequences in question were: (1) a crash in the 
RBV share price; and (2) what appears to be a small run on the bank. A 
meeting of the Comité held just prior to that of the commissarissen 
reveals that in the period 28 June to 5 July the bank’s creditors withdrew 
money to the tune of 42.4 million, bringing reserves to a new total of 96.6 
million.125 However, a fully-blown run on the bank has been avoided: ‘At 
the current moment withdrawals appear to have come to an end.’126 
Contrary to De Vries’s account of the crisis, Westerman’s account to the 
commissarissen notes that Colijn was willing to support the RBV’s share 
price, but the Nederlandsche Bank was not. In the end it was the 
government that provided 10 million guilders with which to stabilise the 
share price because the Nederlandsche Bank refused to do so. But the 
state did not initially want to be seen openly to have lent support to the 
RBV and therefore used an intermediary, the firm Loon & Co.127 Later in 
the same meeting, the minutes record that the Nederlandsche wishes the 
RBV to appoint a ‘competent Dutchman of standing’ as a new director 
who would then help reassure public opinion.128  
 
                                                 
124 Author’s translation, Minutes of College van Commissarissen meeting, 10 July 1924 
125 Minutes of the Comité en Directie meeting, 10 July 1924 
126 Author’s translation, Ibid. 
127 Van Loon & Co. was the brokering firm owned by Hope & Co. Personal 
communication with Dr. Jonker, 1 October 2006. 
128 There is some discussion about the possible identity of such a person. The directors 
appear to like the sound of a certain L. P. van Eeghen, a private banker from 
Amsterdam. 
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Figure 3. Extract from Meeting Minutes of the College van 
Commissarissen, 10 July 1924  
 
Source: ABN AMRO Historisch Archief. 
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On 15 July De Kroniek publishes a detailed report on the RBV 
crisis.129 Among other things, it addresses the following four issues: (1) 
what has occurred in the two weeks following the communiqué; (2) the 
possible cause of the crisis; (3) how the RBV can regain investors’ trust; 
and (4) the role of the central bank in the crisis. These are summarised 
briefly as follows. (1) In the period since the communiqué, the article 
notes that ‘the panicky reaction has disappeared completely and has 
made way for a period of calm, but without any clarification about the 
factual events.’ It argues that this stability is vital for the normal 
functioning of the money markets, despite the fact that it has been 
achieved through artificial means. The author argues that the wording of 
the communiqué was probably too negative and that the liquidity was 
probably never in danger in the first place. (2) The article argues that the 
cause for the plummet in the share price was not negative rumours from 
the press, because otherwise ‘all shares and obligations would always be 
priced at zero’. Instead the author believes the concern was simply 
overvalued as a result of 25 million guilders worth of new RBV shares that 
were issued by the bank 1919 in the middle of the Dutch post-war boom. 
On hindsight, given the current economic malaise, this appears to have 
been a mistake; the article points the finger at the (risky) expansionary 
policy of the bank. (3) The only way in which the RBV can regain the 
public’s trust is to publish a full and frank admission of the bank’s 
mistakes over the years, it argues. The RBV also needs a new banker in 
charge who can be trusted and a new set of commissarissen. (4) The 
article notes that the firm Loon & Co. bought up the shares that stabilised 
the concern’s price at 89 percent of its former value. It speculates that this 
                                                 
129 ‘Kunstmatige en natuurlijke elementen der bankpolitiek’, De Kroniek, 15 July 1924, 
507-508 
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was probably carried out under the guarantee of the Nederlandsche 
Bank, but is unsure. It is very concerned about this course of action.130  
On 17 September, a secret draft restructuring plan is presented to 
RBV’s commissarissen (see Figure ).131 It proposes to reduce the 
capitalisation of the RBV by swapping 25 million guilders worth of shares 
for amortisation certificates against future profits. The source of the 
shares is as follows: 15 million from the state-backed syndicate that was 
formed to support the share price during the intervention, and the 10 
million worth of shares held by Müller & Co. This is to be used to write off 
bad debt (21 million) and buy additional RBV shares (4 million). A further 
3 million of securities and property are to be covered from profits, and 15 
million guilders worth of guarantees towards its subsidiary banks 
(including the NBV) are to come from a newly-created special reserve. De 
Vries’s account of the crisis argues that the Nederlandsche Bank and the 
Dutch state were very involved in the drafting of this restructuring plan.132 
This is supported by the minutes of brief Comité meeting held 
immediately prior to 17 September commissarissen meeting, at which a 
dialogue between the RBV and the Nederlandsche is recounted.133 Also 
at this meeting, director Van der Mandele argues that Furness-Stokvis 
needs to be urgently incorporated into any restructuring plan in order to 
‘prevent an investigation by the Department for Justice’.134
                                                 
130 The article’s very “classical” argumentation for this concern is explained as follows. 
If there is nothing wrong with the RBV, as its directors maintain publicly, then such 
support is unjustified because the share price would readjust in time on itself. If the 
central bank was worried about a possible contagionary effect on other bank stocks, 
then this too would only be temporary if the sector is on the whole healthy. If, on the 
other hand, the there is ‘something rotten’ in the banking sector that the public does not 
know about, then the intervention was justified. 
131 ‘Reconstructieplan’, Minutes of College van Commissarissen meeting, 17 
September 1924 
132 De Vries, Visserings Tijdvak 1914-1931, 253-254. 
133 Minutes of the Comité en Directie meeting, 17 September 1924 
134 Author’s translation, Ibid. 
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The finalised details of this restructuring plan are published only a 
month later in De Kroniek on 15 October 1924.135 The press release also 
informs shareholders that the position of president is to be abolished, that 
Westerman is to be redeployed as a commissaris and that an AB director, 
Van Hengel, is to be made gedelegeerd commissaris, or caretaker 
director.136 Among other things, De Kroniek addresses three issues 
concerning the RBV’s press release: (1) the continued lack of clarity 
concerning the crisis; (2) the possibility of harmful collusion in the banking 
sector; and (3) the position of Westerman. These are addressed as 
follows. (1) The article argues that in many respects the public is none the 
wiser as to why the crisis occurred in the first place. It notes in particular 
the paragraphs in the 1923 annual report in which the bank’s directors 
and commissarissen state that they are happy with the profits. The press 
release also does not reveal the origin of the 25 million to be used to 
reduce the bank’s capitalisation, only that it is from ‘friendly hands’. This 
is not satisfactory, the article argues. It demands to know to what degree 
the state is involved. (2) The choice of Van Hengel as caretaker director 
concerns De Kroniek because he is from the AB. Furthermore, he plans 
to maintain a position at the AB on their supervisory board. The article 
notes that the RBV and AB have traditionally been fierce competitors, and 
that having Van Hengel in this odd dual position is potentially dangerous 
for the consumer. (3) The article notes that if Westerman is truly 
responsible for the crisis, then he should be removed from the bank’s 
management completely, not just be given a new job.137
                                                 
135 ‘Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging’, De Kroniek, 15 October 1924, 579-581 
136 Not Van Eeghen, as the RBV’s management had initially proposed. 
137 De Vries argues that the Nederlandsche Bank and the state pushed Westerman into 
resigning and forced the RBV into accepting a Van Hengel as caretaker director. De 
Vries, Ibid. 
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Figure 4. The RBV’s Secret Restructuring Plan, 17 September 1924 
 
Source: ABN AMRO Historisch Archief. 
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By the time of the next issue of De Kroniek, EGMs have taken 
place at both the RBV and the AB to ratify the restructuring plans and 
staff changes. The article argues that six questions concerning the role of 
the Nederlandsche Bank need answering before the sector can return to 
normality:138 (1) Does the Nederlandsche act objectively? (2) Has the 
Nederlandsche carried out any additional interventions, other than 
ascertaining the liquidity of the RBV, outside of her legal mandate? (3) 
What was the motivation behind the (now infamous) communiqué if, as all 
parties now maintain, the liquidity of the RBV was never in danger? (4) 
Why is the Nederlandsche concerning herself with the internal matters of 
private banks? (5) Has the Nederlandsche acted in the public interest? 
And finally, (6), can the banking sector continue to operate without any 
official regulations, as is currently the case?139
Van Hengel stayed on at the RBV until 1927, after which he 
returned to the AB. Under his reign, a number of wide-sweeping 
managerial and structural reforms were implemented at the RBV. These 
include paving the way for the incorporation of the NBV into the RBV, a 
comprehensive change of personnel on the bank’s supervisory board, 
and the restructuring of bad debt.140 There is even talk of selling the 
bank’s recently constructed flagship branch in Den Haag to rival bank the 
Twentsche Bank.141 Van Hengel’s changes were conducted not without 
some opposition from the RBV’s existing team of directors. For instance, 
on 17 December, Van Hengel pushes for the resignation of Van 
                                                 
138 ‘Uit het Nederlandsche Bankwezen’, De Kroniek, 1 November 1924, 595-596 
139 This last point is echoed by the economist H. M. Hirschfeld in 1925. See footnote 
41. 
140 Especially Van Hengel’s work restructuring the debt of Müller & Co. was important 
for the bank’s long run stability. The ABN AMRO Historisch Archief have a newly 
compiled file of Van Hengel’s correspondence with Kröller and Müller & Co. that 
together build an interesting narrative of the settlement between the two concerns. The 
details of this, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
141 This action was not carried out. Minutes of the Directie meeting, 25 March 1925. 
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Tienhoven from his post at the NBV, to be replaced by Van Hengel 
himself.142 But as a result of objections from management, Van 
Tienhoven was allowed to retain his position.143  
 
4.2.2 An Evaluation of the Universal Banking Hypothesis 
First, a brief characterisation of the 1924 episode of the Dutch crisis 
is made along the lines of Bordo’s recipe.144 The crisis involved the 
following ingredients: (a) a sudden change in expectations as a result of 
new information made available through the media; (b) fear of the RBV’s 
solvency by the public; (d) an actual threat to the RBV’s solvency from 
her riskier clients; (e) a small run on the bank in the first week of July 
1924; and (j) the whole process arrested from further escalation by 
intervention from the central bank and the state. A further important event 
in the crisis was the RBV’s share price collapse.145 This ingredient is not 
present in Bordo’s recipe and can perhaps be interpreted as a symptom 
of ingredients (a) and (b).    
Given the preceding section’s account of the 1924 crisis, a 
discussion of the relationship between banking scope and banking crises 
follows. The two interpretations of the narrative discussed in this section 
are: (1) the RBV’s universal scope was the cause of her difficulties; and 
(2) the bank’s problems were due to general bad management that 
cannot be directly attributed to her banking scope. The evidence for each 
is outlined below.  
(1) Universality as the cause of the crisis. The two routes through 
which a universal banking structure may result in a higher financial crisis 
                                                 
142 Minutes of the Directie meeting, 17 December 1924.  
143 Although eventually Van Tienhoven does have to give up this post. 
144 See Section 3.2 for full list. 
145 The size of this collapse requires further investigation. But for this, a new time series 
of the bank’s stock prices needs to be constructed from contemporary financial 
newspapers. 
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risk are: (a) the lower versatility of universal banks during an economic 
downturn; and (b) the creation of a dual market for lemons.146 With 
respect to (a), the Netherlands was indeed experiencing an economic 
downturn of sorts, the severity of which is debated.147 The RBV did 
indeed have significant long-term interests in industry – especially with 
the firms Furness-Stokvis and Müller & Co. – which made her more 
vulnerable during this downturn. It is clear from internal board papers that 
some of the directors were uneasy about the bank’s association with 
Müller & Co. from an early date. However, this client was not dropped 
early because of its very close association with the bank, primarily 
through cross-ownership of shares. Additionally, conflicts of interest likely 
arose as a result of the dual position of Kröller on the boards of both 
companies. Allowances were granted that other, more conservative, 
banks might not have considered, e.g. for Müller & Co.’s North American 
wheat operations and South American mining subsidiary. Later, by the 
time Westerman himself had finally identified the problem and initiated a 
management reform that excluded Kröller from the decision-making 
process (through his new Comité), it was arguably too late. The damage 
with respect to the bank’s media image had already been done and 
central bank intervention and a totally new management with new 
leadership were required in order to reassure the public and bring the 
crisis to and end. 
With respect to (b) the story is less clear. The theory goes that 
asymmetric information problems arose (1) between borrowers and banks 
that led sound borrowers to exit the market, and simultaneously (2) 
between depositors and banks that caused sound banks to exit the 
market. Ideally, to test this dual market for lemons hypothesis the bank’s 
                                                 
146 See Section 3.2 for a full account of the theory used here. 
147 See discussion in Section 1. 
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changing relationships with a range of clients needs to be tracked over a 
period of time. However, such an exercise was beyond the scope of this 
paper for reasons outlined in Section 4.1. The following should therefore 
be treated only as an indication, and further research is needed.  
The narrative in the previous section recounts some of the ongoing 
information asymmetries between the RBV and the public. It is clear that 
the markets and the media questioned the activities of the bank from an 
early date, especially the lack of detail from her published accounts. The 
public did not know sufficient information about the plight of the bank to 
make an informed decision about her stability. An attempt to correct this 
situation and reassure the public (through publishing the communiqué) 
resulted in a share price crash and large amounts of withdrawals during 
the first week of July 1924. But a full scale run on the bank was avoided. 
To what degree this was a result of a superior flow of information between 
the parties is debatable, as financial commentators were still complaining 
about a lack of clarity months after a full-scale collapse of the bank had 
been averted. The substantial share price support could be interpreted as 
a signalling device to the market that the firm is still worth backing, 
despite the ambiguity at the time surrounding the source of this support. 
(2) General bad management as the cause of the crisis. 
Throughout the narrative, a number of internal management conflicts 
were evident. These include: (a) arguments between Westerman and 
other directors concerning taking on new business, and later when calling 
in the Nederlandsche Bank for help; (b) between directors of the 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam branches of the bank concerning the course 
of action to be taken with respect to Müller & Co.; and also (c) between 
the directors and the commissarissen that ultimately led to the creation of 
a third level of management, the Comité. Although together these 
arguably form good evidence for the “general bad management” 
hypothesis, without a similar investigation into the management 
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processes of the AB it is hard to say whether this was the true cause of 
the crisis. However, such an investigation was made impossible for the 
case of the AB because of archival restrictions.148 As discussed 
elsewhere, the secondary literature argues that the AB’s management 
was indeed more conservative than her rival. Note however that conflicts 
are common in many boardrooms, irrespective of financial stability.  
Internal management conflicts aside, a further indications of 
incompetence was the issuing of dividends to shareholders just months 
before the crisis. Minuted comments by one of the RBV’s directors that 
the bank’s true state of affairs only came to light after the AGM are hard 
to believe, especially considering the years of boardroom discussions 
about bad debt and the critical press coverage that the bank had recently 
been receiving. Even if true, then this is surely an indicator of grave 
management incompetence over many years. 
This section concludes with a note of caution. To what degree the 
two interpretations of the crisis are mutually exclusive is unclear. 
Furthermore, one may be the cause of the other. The RBV’s general bad 
management could be a symptom of the bank’s universal structure. 
Similarly, bad management could have resulted in the bank’s structural 
change towards universalism. Based on the limited evidence presented 
here, this paper speculates that the link is from structure to management 
in that much of the RBV’s problems concern the management of her 
relations with industrial clients, exactly the type of client that universal 
banks have and that specialist commercial banks do not (i.e. her 
management structure was an inevitable consequence of the bank’s 
close involvement in industry). However, the link between the two 
requires further investigation. 
 
                                                 
148 As discussed in Section 4.1. 
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5.  Concluding Comments and Research Agenda 
This paper set out to answer the following two questions: (1) under 
what conditions universal banks come into existence; and (2) whether 
there is a relationship between financial system structure and financial 
crises. Its mode of analysis was a case study examination of the Dutch 
financial system in the early twentieth century, and particularly a 
matched-pair analysis of two competing Dutch banks. The two research 
questions to be addressed in this matched-pair were: (a) whether the 
structural difference presented in the literature between the two banks 
was accurate, and if so, (b) whether it was this difference that explains 
the crisis. The first (a) was addressed using Daniel Verdier’s equity-
deposit ratio methodology whilst the latter (b) used a new and detailed 
narrative of the events of the 1924 episode of the crisis reconstructed 
from primary sources. 
The first question (1) was not addressed satisfactorily due to 
theoretical limitations and measurement difficulties. An answer to the 
second question (2) is more developed. Although there is some debate, 
universal structures arguably increase a bank’s exposure to crises.  This 
works particularly strongly through the lower versatility of universal banks 
during an economic downturn, but may also work through the creation of 
a “dual market for lemons”. Of course, there are many theoretical 
problems in generalising from a case study. It is therefore perhaps 
prudent to restrict these findings to the Dutch case, i.e. the RBV’s 
universal structure caused her financial instability. 
Although this conclusion is by no means concrete, this paper 
nevertheless contributes to the existing literature in four ways. (1) It brings 
together two separate theoretical approaches from two disciplines 
regarding financial system structure. (2) It calculates a new panel of 
equity-deposit ratios that can be used to examine the evolution of the 
Dutch financial system in the early twentieth century. (3) It presents a new 
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narrative of one particular episode in the crisis using primary sources that 
have not previously been used for this purpose. (4) It identifies further 
“gaps in the literature” that require additional research. This last point is 
expanded upon below. 
The study of Dutch banking in the early twentieth century remains a  
fruitful area for future research. This paper is only a starting point in the 
analysis of the determinants of that country’s financial crisis. There are 
four future research topics identified within this paper. (1) This paper has 
only started to analyse the 1924 crisis at the RBV. Much more work 
needs to be done, especially with respect to the bank’s relationship with 
the firm Müller & Co. (2) This paper has only examined the plight of one 
bank in the 1920s crisis. There are of course many more banks operating 
at the time that need to be analysed to gain a fuller picture. Specifically 
the experiences of the smaller rural banks and credit cooperatives, which 
suffered particularly badly, should prove interesting. (3) Although much 
has been written on the topic of financial systems evolution, it remains an 
area of interest for three reasons. (a) The work of Verdier has recently 
reopened the debate. (b) The models presented in this paper were either 
unsatisfactory or difficult to test. (c) It remains unclear how the Dutch 
case fits within the wider European context. (4) The nature of the 
relationship between banking scope and financial stability remains 
unclear. Not only was this difficult to test conclusively using the 
methodology employed in this paper, but there remains no consensus in 
the theoretical literature.  
 
 
64
Appendix: 
 Panel of equity and deposit data for the Big Five Dutch banks, 1911-
1931 
C ap ita l and  
R ese rves D ep o sits
D ep o sit 
R a tio
C ap ita l and  
R ese rves D ep o sits
E q u ity-
D ep o sit R a tio
1 9 1 1 1 1 6 2 0 0 7 9 9 0 0 1 .4 5 1 5 2 0 5 1 2 8 1 6 1 .1 9
1 9 1 2 1 2 9 2 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 1 .6 0 1 9 7 2 5 1 6 7 9 9 1 .1 7
1 9 1 3 1 4 7 1 0 0 8 4 4 0 0 1 .7 4 2 4 1 0 0 1 4 7 4 0 1 .6 4
1 9 1 4 1 5 6 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 0 1 .6 8 2 4 7 5 0 1 6 9 6 7 1 .4 6
1 9 1 5 1 6 0 5 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 .5 8 2 5 5 0 0 2 2 9 6 2 1 .1 1
1 9 1 6 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 0 0 1 .7 0 4 0 3 0 9 3 4 3 7 5 1 .1 7
1 9 1 7 2 5 1 5 0 0 1 7 8 6 0 0 1 .4 1 5 0 6 2 7 4 4 3 7 6 1 .1 4
1 9 1 8 2 8 1 9 0 0 2 5 1 2 0 0 1 .1 2 5 9 3 1 6 6 8 8 2 7 0 .8 6
1 9 1 9 3 8 2 3 0 0 2 8 4 8 0 0 1 .3 4 7 8 7 0 5 7 8 0 8 7 1 .0 1
1 9 2 0 4 3 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 5 0 0 1 .3 8 9 8 0 0 0 6 8 8 2 9 1 .4 2
1 9 2 1 4 3 0 2 0 0 2 3 6 3 0 0 1 .8 2 9 8 5 0 0 6 8 9 3 1 1 .4 3
1 9 2 2 4 2 1 8 0 0 2 2 6 4 0 0 1 .8 6 9 9 0 0 0 5 5 9 2 3 1 .7 7
1 9 2 3 4 2 8 3 0 0 2 2 9 6 0 0 1 .8 7 9 9 5 0 0 5 1 6 2 3 1 .9 3
1 9 2 4 3 8 9 2 0 0 1 9 7 5 0 0 1 .9 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 9 3 5 5 2 .0 5
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Capital and 
Reserves Deposits
Equity-
Deposit Ratio
Capital and 
Reserves Deposits
Equity-
Deposit Ratio
1911 17400 6652 2.62 21364 15316 1.39
1912 25400 7380 3.44 21218 16195 1.31
1913 37800 8241 4.59 21544 17195 1.25
1914 38000 13116 2.90 22075 19196 1.15
1915 41000 18210 2.25 22162 18720 1.18
1916 52000 23148 2.25 21974 19922 1.10
1917 66000 39806 1.66 34302 29717 1.15
1918 67000 37340 1.79 36082 44094 0.82
1919 105000 52478 2.00 49441 49562 1.00
1920 110000 69984 1.57 54192 58873 0.92
1921 111000 32841 3.38 54707 47393 1.15
1922 111500 36633 3.04 54290 50705 1.07
1923 112000 46728 2.40 53710 40578 1.32
1924 70000 21358 3.28 53931 38750 1.39
1925 70000 23558 2.97 54850 59490 0.92
1926 70000 25873 2.71 54856 54023 1.02
1927 70000 38702 1.81 50500 54118 0.93
1928 70000 38166 1.83 51000 69494 0.73
1929 70000 76354 0.92 51500 73596 0.70
1930 70000 81734 0.86 56714 98397 0.58
1931 70000 64588 1.08 57000 87147 0.65
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging Tw entsche Bank
Source: Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
"Eerste Rapport: Geldscheppende Instellingen en Spaarbanken," 1972. 
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